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COMMENT

Sweetening the Pot: The Conservation and
Reinvestment Act Reignites the Property
Rights/Land Conservation Debate for the
Twenty-First Century
OWEN DEMUTHt
But still we feel the need for pristine places, places substantially
unaltered by man. Even if we do not visit them, they matter to us.
We need to know that though we are surrounded by buildings
there are vast places where the world goes on as it always has.
Pristine nature, we recognize, has been overwhelmed in many
places, even in many of our national parks. But in these few spots
it makes a stand.
-Bill McKibben'
INTRODUCTION

On October 11, 2000, President Clinton signed into law
H.R. 4578,2 a bill providing appropriations for the U.S.
Department of the Interior and related agencies for the
upcoming fiscal year. Embedded within the lengthy and
complex legislation are significant monetary appropriations
t J.D. Candidate, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, 2002.
I would like to offer my special thanks to Professor Barry Boyer for his valuable
input and advice.
1. BILL MCKIBBEN,

AN END TO NATURE 55

(1989).

2. Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-291, 114 Stat. 922 (2000).
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for a variety of programs dedicated to land and wildlife
conservation. The funding allocations, which total $12
billion and are to be available for appropriation through
2006, are said to represent the largest congressional
budgetary increase ever in the history of federal conservation initiatives.' In addition, the bill was praised by major
environmental groups for its "remarkable reach," making
funds available for an extremely diverse range of
conservation projects, from urban parks to national forests
to state coastal erosion abatement programs.
There was widespread support for H.R. 4578 in both the
Senate and the House,5 and for the notion that its passage
represented a restored commitment to environmental
conservation that had lay dormant within the body for
years.6 Yet while the legislation was hailed as "an amazing
victory for those who care about preserving our precious
natural resources 7 and an "unprecedented commitment to
conservation efforts by the Federal Government,"8 the 106th
Congress will perhaps be remembered more for the
conservation legislation it did not pass. H.R. 4578 was
recognized as a compromise bill, a piece of legislation that
sailed through in the last days of the congressional session
because of the tremendous amount of effort aimed at
passing a more substantial, controversial bill. That more
controversial legislation, known as the Conservation and
Reinvestment Act of 2000,' or CARA, represents the most
successful attempt of Congress to date to provide a
dedicated source of funding for federal and state land
conservation and preservation initiatives.
In terms of sheer dollar amounts, CARA dwarfed the
land conservation and preservation goals of H.R. 4578 and
other federal land acquisition programs:" while the Interior
3. See Congress's $12 Billion Nod to Conservation (Oct. 6, 2000), availibleat
http://www.nrdc.org/news/newsDetails.asp?nID=194 (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
4. Id.
5. The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 83-13, 146 CONG. REC. S9917
(2000). The House passed it by a vote of 348-69. 146 CONG. REC. H8656 (2000).
6. See John Krist, The Big Bill That Got Away, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Nov.
16, 2000, at B08; see also EnvironmentalWins and a Loss, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov.
10, 2000, at 16C.
7. 146 CONG. REC. H8642 (2000) (statement of Rep. Obey).
8. 146 CONG. REC. S9910 (2000) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
9. H.R. 701, 106th Cong. (2000).
10. See, e.g., The Forest Legacy Program, 16 U.S.C. § 2103c (1994 & Supp.).
The Forest Legacy Program is a federal initiative run by the U.S. Forest Service
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appropriations bill made at least $1.6 billion available in
2001, with annual increases until it peaks at $2.4 billion at
the program's end in 2006,11 CARA would have allocated
nearly $3 billion annually until 2015.12 More significantly,
the funding authorized by CARA would have been available
only for purposes of the Act, 3 while the Interior appropriations bill includes no such restrictions.
At the same time, the CARA legislation, with its builtin safeguards for property rights and its incentives to
landowners to protect endangered species, represents an
important step forward in the effort to reconcile increased
federal involvement in the conservation policy arena with
an acknowledged need to preserve the autonomy of private
property owners. As this Comment will discuss below, any
legislation proposing to dramatically increase the role of
government in the purchase and management of public
lands must compete with the highly sensitive issue of
private land ownership. Especially in the American Midwest, where public land holdings are considerable, coalitionbuilding efforts to set aside land as open space frequently
wither under the political rhetoric of interests who
champion commercial exploitation of those lands. CARA
made more progress than any piece of federal legislation in
recent history by attempting to demonstrate that the goals
of both sides were not mutually exclusive, but could be
realized with some finely tuned compromises. While the
right to put private property to one's own uses remains a
cherished pillar of American culture, the interest in
conserving some of that property for public enjoyment,
health, and recreation has done some catching up in the
last few years.
CARA, even in defeat, symbolizes the changing
attitudes of the nation's elected officials, activist organizathat focuses on acquiring and preserving forests that are threatened with
conversion to nonforest uses. The fiscal year 2000 appropriation of $29,933,000,
by far the largest allocation ever authorized by Congress for this program, falls
far short of CARA's funding goals, even for specific spending categories within
the legislation. See U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. FOREST SERVICE, FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM
OVERVIEW (2000), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/ cooperativeforestry/legacy_
overview.PDF (last visited Apr. 8, 2002); see also H.R. 701, §5.
11. Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-291, 114 Stat. 1003, § 801 (2000).
12. H.R. 701, § 5.
13. Id. § 203 ("Amounts available for obligation or expenditure from the
fund ... may be obligated or expended only as provided in this Act.").

758

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

tions, and citizens toward the nature and extent of
government involvement in conservation initiatives. The
widespread bipartisan1 support it received, not only from
members of Congress," but from state and local officials
and organizations across the country,15 offers strong
indications that the traditionally well-marked battle lines
historically drawn between environmentalists and those
who uphold the supremacy of the free market and the
property rights movement continue to blur and fade. While
Americans staunchly defend their constitutionally protected
rights to own and alter their land as they wish, they are
finding that their love of open spaces and readily available
outdoor recreational resources demands increasingly more
effort to preserve that land. CARA and its offspring stand
for the premise that the United States is entering into a
new type of debate over the conservation of our natural
resources, one that recognizes that the old foundations upon
which it was laid must now give way to different ways of
conceptualizing man's relationship to his environment.
This Comment will focus on the circumstances
surrounding and leading up to the drafting of CARA and
the ensuing push to pass it into law. An analysis of the bill
and the statute it was meant to revitalize, the Land and
Water Conservation Fund Act of 1965,16 will examine how
the federal government first defined its role and the role
that governments of all levels were to play in the newly
reinvigorated conservation debate that continues to evolve
today.
This Comment will then discuss how increased pressure
from external factors, especially the growing awareness of
urban sprawl, further established the parameters of this
issue, forcing elected officials of every stripe to pay more
attention to the swelled ranks of activists clamoring for
14. CARA passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 315-102 on May
11, 2000. 146 CONG. REC. H2951 (2000). CARA was also reported out of the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (with amendments) by a
thirteen to seven vote. 146 CONG. REC. S8584 (2000). Moreover, shortly before it
stalled, more than sixty Senators had indicated their support for the bill. See
EnvironmentalWins and a Loss, supra note 6, at 16C.
15. CARA was supported by all fifty governors of the United States and by
more than 5000 conservation, civic, business, and religious organizations. See
Allan R. Egbert & Mark Van Putten, Promises Are No Substitute for Reliable
ConservationFunding, SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 23, 2000, at 23A.
16. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 (1994).
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more public land. These pressures in turn have induced the
states to develop a variety of creative open-space initiatives,
many of which have also become increasingly dependent on
funding and policy direction from the national government.
The next section will discuss how governments in general,
as evidenced by the enactment of and subsequent support
for CARA, are continuing to back away from a regulationbased approach to land use conservation. A brief
examination of recent takings cases will suggest that courts
continue to impose increasingly stringent limits on the
right of governmental entities to dictate growth to the
private sector through the use of statutes and ordinances, a
trend that is making conservation by outright acquisition
more appealing. The last section will examine how the
debate over CARA has brought to light concerns that
persist, especially in the American West, over federally
initiated acquisition programs, and how the bill's authors
tried to placate their fears.
I. AN OLD PROMISE: THE LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION
FUND ACT OF 1965

The Land and Water Conservation Fund Act (LWCFA)
was enacted in 1965 in order to create a special account
within the federal budget for recreation and preservationoriented land acquisition. Predating many of the other
substantive pieces of environmental legislation that now
exist today, the Land and Water Conservation Fund
(LWCF) has been the principal source of moneys to acquire
new recreation lands. The legislative findings announced
that:
The purposes of [the Act] are to assist in preserving, developing
and assuring accessibility to all citizens of the United States of
America of present and future generations.., such quality and
quantity of outdoor recreation resources as may be available and
are necessary and desirable for individual active participation in
the health and vitality of the
such recreation and to strengthen
citizens of the United States .... 18

17.

JEFFREY ZINN,

CONSERVATION FUND:

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LAND AND WATER
CURRENT STATUS AND ISSUES (2000), available at

http://cnie.orgNLE/CRSreports/Public/pub-l.cfm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 (1994).

760

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

To this end, the Act authorizes the providing of funds
and federal assistance 9 to the states in "planning, acquisition, and development of needed land and water areas and
facilities and ...providing funds for the Federal acquisition

and development of certain lands and other areas."2 The
legislation received widespread support in Congress and
from the states, largely because the nation was beginning to
feel the strain of increased development pressures resulting
from the economic upswing of the post-World War Two
decades.2
Originally, the funding for the LWCF was to come from
only two identified sources: fees collected from users of
public recreational facilities and revenue generated from
the sale of federal surplus lands.22 The statute was later
amended to allow for deposits into the fund from taxes on
motorboat fuels and proceeds received from federal leases of
offshore oil and gas exploration and extraction pursuant to
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.23 These proceeds
have accounted for more than 90% of the deposits made into
the LWCF over the past decade.24
The LWCF is authorized to spend $900 million each
year on projects and acquisitions consistent with the Act's
purpose, but Congress must approve each allocation
through the normal budgetary appropriation process.25 In
other words, funding that is "authorized" for the program
will not actually be committed to serve its purposes until
19. Beside administering to the funding, the Secretary of the Interior is also
required to provide technical assistance and advice to state and local
government and private entities on the subject of recreational resources. See 16
U.S.C. § 4601-1(d) (1994).
20. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-4 (1994).

21. See OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMMISSION, OUTDOOR
RECREATION FOR AMERICA 83 (1962) [hereinafter ORRRC REPORT] ("The typical
subdivision of postwar suburbia squandered the recreation potentials; it
splattered houses all over the countryside in a rigid pattern of equal size lots,
and thereby fouled the very amenities people moved outwards to seek.").

22. See LAWRENCE KUMINS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUE BRIEF
NO. IB10005, OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF: OIL AND GAS LEASING AND REVENUE
(2000), available at http://cnie.org(NLE/CRSreports/energy/eng-45.cfm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2002).
23. Pub. L. No. 90-401, 82 Stat. 355 (1968) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 4601-5 (c) (2)).
24. See ZINN, supra note 17.
25. See 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6 (1994) ("Moneys covered into the fund shall be
available for expenditure for the purposes of this part only when appropriated
therefor.").
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affirmative legislative action is taken to appropriate it,
foreclosing the possibility that it will be impounded for
some other use. The money available in the fund may be
distributed in one of two ways: through programs
administered at the federal level affecting federally owned
resources or through grants given to state authorities for
the purchase and management of state-owned land ("stateside program"). The federal program, which is required to
comprise at least 40% of the available funding, makes
funds available to federal agencies that have jurisdiction
over federally owned public land. In most cases, the four
major land management agencies-the Forest Service in
the Department of Agriculture, the National Park Service,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Bureau of Land
Management in the Department of the Interior-receive the
bulk of the federal-side appropriations.27 The National Park
Service manages the state-side program, providing
matching grants to states for recreation planning, development, and acquisition of land and water.8 Before becoming
eligible for federal matching funds in this manner, a state is
required by the statute to develop a Statewide Comprehensive Outdoor Recreation Plan (SCORP) providing "an
evaluation of the demand for and supply of outdoor
recreation resources and facilities in the state
29 ... [as well
as] a program for implementation of the plan.
From many perspectives, the LWCF has been one of the
most successful federal environmental statutes. Numerous
amendments have been made to both increase the funding
ceiling ° and to expand the purposes for which the funds
could be used.3 The federal land management agencies
26. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-7 (1994).
27. See ZINN, supra note 17.
28. See 16 U.S.C. § 4601-8 for a breakdown of state and federal spending
requirements for the LWCF's state-side program.
29. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-8(d) (1994).
30. The original annual funding ceiling of the LWCFA was $100 million.
This increased to $200 million in fiscal year 1970, $300 million for fiscal years
1971-1977, and $900 million annually since fiscal year 1978.
31. The amendments have recognized that open space preservation and
wildlife protection are equally valid reasons to appropriate moneys from the
LWCF. See Pub. L. No. 94-422, § 101(4), 90 Stat. 1317-18 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 4601-9 and 16 U.S.C. § 1534) (1976) (allowing the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service to acquire lands for the purpose of establishing or adding to
wildlife refuges without having to subsequently develop facilities on them); see
also The Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99-645, § 302,
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have used the funds made available by the act to purchase
or acquire through exchange approximately 4.5 million
acres. The state-side program administered by the National Park Service has also been active; more than 37,000
projects and about 2.3 million acres have been funded
through this component of the statute.33 However, as
resources become increasingly scarce and development
pressures build, much attention has been brought to the
perceived inadequacies of the LWCF in properly living up to
its potential as a safeguard of public open space and
recreational resources.
The central bone of contention regarding the recent
push to reform the LWCF (eventually leading to the
drafting of CARA) focused on the vulnerability of the fund
to diversion for other purposes. The LWCF is commonly
referred to as a "trust fund," implying that the money set
aside for its spending purposes cannot not be used for
unrelated programs. However, the nature of the Fund
created by the statute is perhaps best understood by its
true designation as a "special account."34 While the Fund is
credited with revenues up to the established annual ceiling
of $900 million, Congress must still appropriate the money
before it can be spent. Deposits made into the Fund, then,
are not truly deposits in the sense that they represent an
authorization of moneys that may be spent only for
purposes consistent with the Fund's enabling statute. Any
authorized expenditure that is not dispensed to achieve the
Fund's purposes remains in the general fund of the U.S.
Treasury and may be spent for other federal activities and
programs.37 Moreover, because it is a special account, no
interest can accrue to the unappropriated funds. 8
Because of these restrictions placed on the moneys that
would otherwise be dedicated to the LWCF, the amount
100 Stat. 3587 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 3921) (1994) (removing the
prohibition on the use of LWCF appropriations for waterfowl areas).
32. See ZINN, supra note 17.
33. See id.
34. See id. at n.3.
35. Ross W. GORTE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT No. 95-970,
ENR LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION FUND: CURRENT FUNDING (1995),
available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/natural/nrgen-l.cfm
(last
visited Apr. 8, 2002).
36. See id.
37. See ZINN, supra note 17.
38. GORTE, supra note 35, at n.3.
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that actually gets earmarked for conservation projects is
wholly within the discretion of Congress. Absent any
language in the LWCF requiring or specially designating its
expenditures as insulated from the budgetary process,
political differences between Congress and the various
presidential administrations that have presided in the
thirty-five years since the statute's enactment have been
the primary driving force behind the Fund's dispensation.
As a result, the LWCF has historically been under-funded,
usually by as much as 50% to 60% below its authorization
ceiling. The table below describes the wide fluctuation in
LWCF expenditures that have determined the degree to
which it has been able to undertake land conservation
programs and activities:
TOTAL LWCF APPROPRIATIONS
Fiscal Year 1980 - Fiscal Year 1999"9
(dollars in millions)
Fiscal Year
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

LWCF Appropriations
$509.2
$288.6
$179.9
$335.1
$295.9
$286.6
$169.2
$193.1
$170.5
$206.2
$249.3
$341.7
$321.4
$283.7
$255.6
$216.8
$138.1
$159.4
$969.1*
$328.7

39. JOHN SAMATULSKI & ERIC SIY, ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES
SHORTCHANGED: NEW YORK STATE AND THE LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION
FUND 1996 (LWCF appropriations for fiscal years 1980-1993); KUMINS, supra
note 22, at tbl.2 (LWCF appropriations for fiscal years 1994-1999).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

764

2000

[Vol. 50

$420.1

*Includes $600 million from DOI appropriation for priority
land acquisition, exchanges, and maintenance as part of the
1997 budget deal as a one-time item.

The chronic under-funding of the LWCF did not escape
the notice of a rising coalition of environmental groups and
civic organizations, bent on securing a stronger federal
commitment to a slew of conservation projects across the
nation. 4' Lobbying efforts became especially strong during

the late 1980s and early 1990s, peaking when the state-side
funding was eliminated from

1995 to 1999.41 As the

concerns over the federal deficit that led to record lows for
the LWCF in the early 1990s gave way to a budget
surplus,42 the conservation movement saw an opportunity to
push Congress for reform of the statute. 8
II. THE ROLE

OF THE COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE

LWCF

One of the primary reasons that the LWCF had been
long overlooked by both government officials and activists
alike is that, as a statute concerned with establishing a
federal funding mechanism for conservation purposes, there
are few substantive or action-forcing components involved.
Unlike the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Water
Act (just to name a few of our extant environmental laws),
there are few deadlines, mandates, or standards to which
the recipients of LWCF funds and their administering

40. See, e.g., SAMATULSKI & SlY, supra note 39; see also LWCF COALITION,
PRIORITIES FOR THE LAND AND WATER CONSERVATION FUND-FY '95 (1994); LAND
AND WATER CONSERVATION FUND/URBAN PARK AND RECREATION RECOVERY
PROGRAM, AN AMERICAN NETWORK OF PARKS AND OPEN SPACE: CREATING A
CONSERVATION AND RECREATION LEGACY (1994).
41. See ZINN, supra note 17.
42. See JEFFREY A. ZINN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, ISSUE BRIEF,
THE LANDS LEGACY
INITIATIVE AND CARA:
ALTERNATIVE
LEGISLATIVE
APPROACHES TO CONSERVING NATURAL RESOURCES IN THE 106TH CONGRESS (Nov.

15, 2000), availableat http://www.agriculturelaw.com/aglibrary/articles
/legacynovl5_00.htm (last visted Apr 8, 2002).
43. See, e.g., Americans for Our Heritage and Recreation (AHR), at
http://www.ahrinfo.org/ahr.html (last visited Dec. 31, 2000). AHR began in 1997
as a grassroots organization formed for the sole purpose of reforming the
LWCF. More than 150 organizations now participate in its efforts to make the
Fund a more visible and secure source of conservation funding.
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agencies must adhere."
Because the congressional
appropriators are given such vast discretion over how and
whether to use the moneys authorized by the statute, those
disillusioned with its implementation have often
historically had little or no recourse in the courts.
A. Conversion of LWCF-Acquired Parklands
Although the courts have been reluctant to allow the
LWCF to be used as the focal point of most legal issues,
they have been active in resolving actions challenging the
right of agencies that have purchased lands with LWCF
funds to convert those lands to uses not intended by the
statute. The LWCFA provides that
No property acquired or developed with assistance under this
section shall, without the approval of the Secretary [of the
Interior], be converted to other than public outdoor recreation
uses. The Secretary shall approve such conversion only if he finds
it to be in accord with the then existing comprehensive statewide
outdoor recreation plan and only upon such conditions as he deems
necessary to assure the substitution of other recreational
properties of at least equal fair market value and of reasonably
equivalent usefulness and location.45

In Friends of the Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark,46 the
Secretary of the Interior had approved the amending of a
conservation easement in order to allow expansion of a
nearby golf course onto lakeside property that had
previously been bought and maintained as permanent open
space with LWCF moneys. The plaintiffs, a not-for-profit
group organized for the purpose of preserving the
Shawangunk Mountains as a natural resource, argued that
the amendment would constitute an improper conversion
under the statute. The district judge disagreed, holding that
since the public did not have access to the lands encumbered by the easement, the lands were not intended for
outdoor recreational use, and therefore were beyond the
reach of the statute.47 In finding for the plaintiffs, the court
44. The LWCF does, however, provide very specific standards for the
charging of user and entrance fees at areas within the National Park System.
See 16 U.S.C. § 4601-6a (1994).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 4601-8(f)(3) (2000).
46. 754 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. Friends of the Shawangunks v. Clark, 585 F. Supp 195 (N.D.N.Y 1984).
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took a broad interpretation of "public outdoor recreation
uses," concluding that the action of the Secretary

constituted an improper conversion under the statute. 48 The

court further held that such uses envisioned by the LWCF
did not necessarily mean members of the general public had
to be physically present on the property (in this case, the
lands covered by the easement were not accessible to the
public at the time the Secretary approved the conversion).49
In so holding, the court rejected the previously held notion
that Congress had intended only to acquire and protect
properties suitable for "active physical recreation."5 The
rule of Friendsof Shawangunks greatly expanded the reach
of the LWCF by conferring, through enforcement of the
conversion restrictions, the same amount of protection upon
land left in its natural state as land used for recreation
purposes: "It is after all a 'conservation' fund act.
Conservation may include, though it is by no means
necessarily limited to, the protection of a present resource
in its natural state. Indeed the Act's stated purposes
include 'preserving' the 'quality' of outdoor recreation
resources. 51
Subsequent court decisions have frustrated actions
brought by parties seeking to ensure that lands purchased
with LWCF funds were not later converted into uses not
addressed by the statute. The plaintiffs in Quince Orchard
Valley Citizens Association, Inc v. Hodel" had brought suit
to enjoin officials of Montgomery County, Maryland from
beginning construction on a new four-lane highway that
would convert twenty-one acres of parkland into road. They
argued that the National Park Service (NPS) had acted in
violation of the LWCF's conversion proviso by approving the
construction.53 The Fourth Circuit applied a well
established four-prong test to determine whether the
district court had abused its discretion in refusing to grant
the injunction, considering: "1) plaintiffs' likelihood of
success on the merits of the underlying dispute; 2) whether
the plaintiff [would] suffer irreparable harm if interim relief
[was] denied; 3) the harm to the defendant if an injunction
48. 754 F.2d at 449.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 450.
51. Id.
52. 872 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1988).
53. Id. at 78.
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is issued; and 4) the public interest. 5 4 Using this "balance of
harms" test, the court then found for the defendants,
denying the injunction on the grounds that the plaintiffs
had caused much of the harm alleged by their own choice to
wait until nine months after the final approval had been
given for the road construction.55 In more recent cases
where they have had to determine if an improper
conversion had taken place, the courts have been careful to
show great deference to the judgment of the agency making
the initial determination. The Quince Orchard Valley court
stressed the importance of seeking injunctive relief in a
timely manner, stating that "a long delay in seeking relief
indicates that speedy action is not required."56 Whether the
NPS had improperly granted the conversion of the park
property was not reached in favor of consideration of the
defendants' equitable rights: "Equity demands that those
who would challenge the legal sufficiency of administrative
decisions concerning time sensitive public construction
projects do so with haste and dispatch. To require any less
could well result in costly disruptions of ongoing public
planning and construction." 7
The decision in Quince OrchardValley emphasizes that
challenges to a proposal to alter lands purchased with
LWCF funds on the grounds that it constitutes an improper
conversion will only be entertained for a limited period of
time; plaintiffs in such cases need to move quickly to assert
the likelihood of irreparable harm from proposed projects on
LWCF-maintained lands. Quince Orchard Valley does not
necessarily represent an effort on the part of the courts to
move away from the conversion restrictions upheld in
Friends of the Shawangunks, but it is a strong indication
that they will be applied only when they act quickly enough
to meet judicial and procedural deadlines. It is not known
why the plaintiffs in Quince Orchard Valley took so long to
bring their action; perhaps, as a non-profit organization,
they suffered from a lack of resources and organization in
acquiring the appropriate legal assistance. In any case, it is
clear that courts will be more likely to give weight to the

54. Id. at 79.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 80 (quoting Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees of Bloomsburg State Coll.,
353 F. Supp. 542, 543 (M.D. Pa. 1973)).
57. Id.
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construction expense and effort already placed into a
potential conversion through the "balance of harms" test,
regardless of the merits of the challenger's case, when the
harm to be suffered by the challengers is seen as "very
much the result of their own procrastination."58
The question of how the courts would handle the LWCF
conversion issue was further developed in Sierra Club v.
Davies."9 In this case, the plaintiffs charged that plans for
preliminary testing in Arkansas's Crater of Diamonds state
park (established in part with the help of LWCF funds in
1976) for determining the feasibility of commercial diamond
mining constituted an improper conversion. 60 The NPS,
heeding the arguments of the Department of the Interior
that the testing alone would not signify a conversion since
the possibility still existed that no mining would take place
on the park grounds, had given its approval for the project.6'
The Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's finding that
the testing represented a conversion to nonrecreational
uses not contemplated by the Act, recognizing that the
language of the statute did not expressly cover the issue the
agencies had attempted to resolve.62 The court, in determining that the statute did not define conversion, found
that the agency's construction of the term (that the testing
in itself was not a conversion) was reasonable.63 The
majority justified its decision that the conversion was
acceptable by focusing on the nature of the use's impact
rather than whether it was nonrecreational by nature:
58. 872 F.2d at 79.
59. 955 F.2d 1188 (8th Cir. 1992).
60. The court noted that the testing would require the drilling of twenty-five
to thirty holes within a fifty by one hundred foot section of public land that
would be fenced off for twelve weeks. After the drilling, the park would then be
returned to its normal state. Id. at 1190.
61. See id. at 1191.
62. See id. at 1193.
63. See id. The testing did not fall within any of the four situations where
the Department has found that conversions generally occur:
(1) Property interests are conveyed for nonpublic outdoor recreation
uses.
(2) Nonrecreation uses (public or private) are made of the project area,
or a portion thereof.
(3) Noneligible indoor recreation facilities are developed within the
project area without (National Park Service) approval.
(4) Public outdoor recreation use of property acquired or developed with
LWCF assistance is terminated.
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If Phase I testing constituted a nonrecreational "use," it plausibly
could constitute a conversion. But under Phase I testing, there is
"use" of the park only in the strictest sense. The park's purpose is
by no means turned nonrecreational. The exploratory drilling does
not limit public use of the park, except for the ten to twelve-week
period when a 5,000 square foot region will be cordoned off. No
permanent damage will come to the land and the available supply
of minerals available to public visitors will not be depleted. An
interpretation of the regulations holding such activity a
nonrecreational "use" would render virtually any temporary, de
minimis, nondestructive activity a conversion.

By deferring to the agency's construction of the LWCF
statute, the court sought to maintain the right of agencies
to reevaluate the potential future uses of lands purchased
with LWCF funds without having to adhere to an "ironclad
policy" that would subject its decision-making processes to a
"grid of arbitrary distinctions."" Although the Davies court
offered a valid distinction between its holding and the one
expressed in Friends of the Shawangunks,66 there was no
doubt that the ability of LWCF-implementing agencies to
safeguard the lands they acquired for uses consistent with
the statute had been dramatically weakened. The Davies
holding signifies that the broad flexibility and deference
generally afforded by appellate courts to administrative
actions would prevail over a more literal reading of the
statute and its relevant regulations.67
In the more recent case of Friendsof IronbridgePark v.
8 whatever binding effect the LWCF may have had
Babbit,"
in ensuring that property purchased with its moneys was
used only for purposes contemplated by the statute was
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id.
66. The court distinguished itself from Friends of the Shawangunks by
noting that the conversion forming the basis of the lawsuit there represented a
"virtual transfer of title" that would alter the character of the land. Id. at 1195.
67. The dissent in Davies chose to adopt just such a literal interpretation,
stating:
Had Congress intended to exempt temporary non-conforming uses [the
Interior's Department's basis for permitting the conversion] from the
usual statutory requirements, the enabling statute would have said so.
Were the Secretary nonetheless to interpret the statute so as to allow
such temporary non-conforming uses, regulations to that effect should
have been promulgated through proper rule-making procedures.
Id. at 1197 (McMillan, J., dissenting) (emphases omitted).
68. No. 98-2373, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16896 (4th Cir. July 22, 1999)
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further eroded. Here, the plaintiffs had challenged a decision by the NPS that its approval was not required for the
construction of a golf course in a park partially developed
with LWCF funds. The circuit court upheld the district
judge's decision that the agency's approval was not required
because the project would only entail development of 150 of
the park's 400 acres. In so holding, the court accepted the
NPS's interpretation of its own conversion regulation that
the entire property must be subject to conversion before
agency review is acquired.69 The court was again extremely
deferential to the agency's construction of the statute.
Despite acknowledging that the construction would indeed
displace some of the recreational uses of the park," the
court, applying the standard "arbitrary and capricious" test
for the administrative action, found that the it was
acceptable for the NPS to withhold review of the project:
"Because construction of the golf facility on 150 acres of the
park will not change the mixed character of the park as a
whole, the regulations do not require NPS approval before
the golf facility can be constructed."'"
Friends of Ironbridge continued to tighten the
chokehold, further limiting the effectiveness of the LWCF
and subsequent regulations in maintaining consistent uses
for the property it helped acquire. The aforementioned
cases illustrate the particular vulnerability of the LWCF to
judicial deference to agencies, a doctrine that was
dramatically expanded by the United States Supreme Court
in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
2 Though its central purpose may
Council."
be simply to
69. According to the regulation, agency approval would be required if the
proposed construction would "significantly contravene the original plans for the
area." Id.; 36 C.F.R. § 59.3(d) (2001).
70. 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16896 at 5. ("[Construction of the golf facility
would displace some hiking and biking trails.").
71. Id. at 7-8. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on the
NPS regulation stating that "a project area should be viewed in the context of
overall use." 36 C.F.R § 59.3(d) (2001). The circuit court accepted the finding of
the district judge that "even if the master plan with the golf facility was
completed, over fifty percent of the park would remain undeveloped." 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 16896 at 5.
72. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The Chevron court set forth a two-step analysis for
review of agency decisions. First, the reviewing court should look to whether
Congress has expressly authorized the agency to rule as it did. Id. at 842-43. If
the statute is silent on the issue, the court should not simply seek to impose its
own construction on the statute. Instead, the court should determine whether
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secure funding for conservation-oriented projects, the
effectiveness of the LWCF has clearly been limited by
courts' willingness to equate the gaps and ambiguities
within the statute with express delegations of agency
authority." A brief examination of the key cases addressing
issues of standing for actions brought under the LWCF will
further underscore how the statute's ambiguity has worked
at cross-purposes with its legislative intent.
B. The LWCF and the Standing Doctrine
Johnson v. Morton 74 was the seminal case involving the
court's need to address whether parties alleging an injury
to an interest protected by the LWCF had standing to bring
the action directly under the statute. There, the plaintiffs
were seeking the court's help in stopping the purchase of a
parcel of land with LWCF funds because it would reduce
the remaining funds available under the statute such that
it would "jeopardize the orderly development of parks in
other areas of the state for several years.7 5 The court
rejected the plaintiffs' argument that this decision sufficed
to meet the injury in fact requirement necessary to prove
standing in the suit. The Johnson court declared that the
plaintiffs' injury was little more than "a frustration of their
interest in the allocation of state funds for recreational
purposes."7 The court further held that LWCF could not
support the plaintiffs' cause of action because the Secretary
of the Interior had no jurisdiction over how the state
allocated its LWCF grant moneys.77 Although the decision of
the Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission did constitute an
the agency's decision is based upon a permissible construction of the statute. Id.
at 843. In this way the Chevron court held that many agency rulings could
properly be upheld because a statutory ambiguity can often be interpreted as
"an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation." Id. at 843-44.
73. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 833 (2001) (discussing ways to resolve the confusion created by
the Chevron holding as to exactly when the mandatory deference doctrine
should apply).
74. 456 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1972).
75. Id. at 73. The Texas Parks and Wildlife Commission had decided to
devote all available funds to the acquisition and development of Mustang Island
(the parcel in question) to the exclusion of other areas. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
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altering of acquisition priorities delineated in its SCORP,
this too was permissible.7 ' Finally, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that federal funds approved by the
Secretary (matching, according to the provisions of the
statute, the state-generated funds) established an injury,
since without them, the purchase of the contested parcel
might not be possible. The "federal nexus" was an
extremely tenuous one, stated the court, which concluded
that "[t]he change in priorities by the state agency is at
bottom all that can'' be said to have a causal connection to
the alleged injury.

1

Subsequent court decisions would deny parties the right
to allege injuries from the way government agencies
managed proceeds from the LWCF. In Conservation Law
Foundationof New England, Inc. v. Harper,° a coalition of

conservation and environmental organizations charged that
the federal Property Review Board81 illegally credited
proceeds from surplus property sales towards the offsetting
of the national debt instead of making them exclusively
available for the purposes of the LWCF.82 Such an
allegation, the court determined, was not a sufficient
demonstration of the injury in fact requirement despite the
statute's requirement that "'all proceeds ... received from
any disposal of surplus real property and related personal
property'... shall be credited to the Land and Water
Conservation Fund." 3 The Harper court upheld the right of
the agency to divert funds that would normally be deposited
into the LWCF for other purposes:
Congress, under the LWCA, may appropriate as much or as little
money for conservation purposes from the Fund as it may
choose... and it may supplement that amount by moneys from
other revenue sources. I rule that it is speculative at best to
predict that defendants' failure to pay proceeds from property
sales into the Fund has reduced, or is likely to reduce, the amount
of Congressional appropriations for federal or state conservation

78. See id.
79. Id.
80. 587 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1984).
81. The property review board was created by President Reagan in 1982 for
the purpose of "improving management of Federal real property." Exec. Order
No. 12,348, 47 Fed. Reg. 8547 (1982).
82. 587 F. Supp. at 365.
83. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. 4601-5(a)).
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84

The court further denied plaintiffs' standing on the
grounds that they failed to prove that a court order
requiring the property proceeds to be paid into the LWCF
would increase the amount that was actually appropriated
by Congress for conservation purposes.85
Later developments have consistently followed the
boundaries laid out by the Johnson and Harper decisions in
denying parties a cause of action under the LWCF statute.
The plaintiffs in Sportsmen's Wildlife Defense Fund v.
Babbit,86 representing local citizens who utilized the outdoor
recreational resources of Rifle, Colorado, went to court to
obtain an injunction against the proposed expansion of a
prison facility onto an area used for hunting. It was held
that the plaintiffs had met the initial test of determining
whether the LWCF created a federal right enforceable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in that the parties bringing the
action were among those the statute intended to benefit,
but the ambiguity of the statute meant that it could not be
the basis for granting the action.87 The court focused on the
statute's lack of guidance in instructing the Secretary of the
Interior how to distribute LWCF moneys to states,
concluding that no "enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities" within the meaning of § 1983 existed. The same
court would then reiterate its holding three years later in
Sportsmen's Wildlife Defense Fund 11, a related proceeding
84. 587 F. Supp. at 365-66 (citation omitted).
85. See id. at 366.
86. 949 F. Supp. 1510 (D. Colo. 1996).
87. A plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute is generally permitted
to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless (1) "the statute does not create enforceable
rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983," or (2) "Congress
has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself." Wright
v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 423
(1987).
88. 949 F. Supp. at 1520-21. The court reasoned that the seemingly
mandatory terms used in the LWCF such as "shall" and "required" were
rendered "precatory" by the considerable amount of discretion subsequently
conferred upon the Secretary. Id. at 1520. The court further supported its
holding by declaring that, even though states were required to submit a SCORP
before becoming eligible for LWCF funding, no additional specific actions could
be imposed, since the plan's contents were "variable and cannot be determined
by the state in advance." Id.
89. Sportsmen's Wildlife Defense Fund v. Babbitt, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D.
Colo. 1999). The court in the later proceeding would refer to this case and the
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in which the plaintiffs were again denied standing under
the LWCF due to the statute's failure to create enforceable
rights. 9°
The cases discussed above illustrate that the LWCFA,
due to its ambiguity and lack of express enforcement
standards, lends itself particularly well to the foreclosure of
citizen suits under standard theories of administrative law.
The LWCF is enabled by a broad discretionary statute, and
as a consequence makes it difficult for anyone to challenge
questionable uses of its funding provisions. It simply does
not lend itself to novel legal attacks; as a result, the
potential of the Act for reaching its true potential for
advancing conservation initiatives has been severely
curtailed. CARA, as an attempt to achieve legislatively
what has not heretofore been possible judicially, represents
Congress's first major effort to provide at least some
stability to the way the Act's funds are used.
III. PUSHING FOR A 'TRUE LEGACY': SETTING THE STAGE FOR
LWCF REFORM
A. Permanent FederalFundingfor Open Space: Is America
Ready for a New Entitlement?
It could be said that the federal government first
seriously considered the idea of permanently funding
conservation projects when President Eisenhower first
created the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review
Commission (ORRRC) in 1958."' The commission was
charged with the task of conducting a three-year inquiry
into America's increasing need for open space.92 The
Commission concluded its study by recommending that the
federal government increase its holdings through an aggressive program of acquisition that would help complete
the developing National Park System.93 Their report was
previous one as Rifle I and II, respectively.
90. See id. at 1200.
91. See Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Act, Pub. L. No. 85-470, 72
Stat. 238 (1958).
92. The Act charged the commission with basing their report upon the
premise that "lands, waters, rangelands, wetlands, wildlife and such other
natural resources

that

serve economic

purposes

recreation purposes." Id., 72 Stat. 241.
93. See ORRRC REPORT, supra note 21, at 127-36.

also

serve ...

outdoor
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also the first to suggest that the federal agencies develop
intercooperative agreements with state and local governments in order to leverage federal funds with matching
94
state money.
The ORRRC report led to the creation of many
ambitious conservation initiatives in which the federal
government would play a dominant role.95 The ORRRC's
findings were also instrumental in the enactment of the
original version of the Land and Water Conservation Fund
Act.96 However, when it became increasingly evident to
supporters of the statute that large amounts of the
available funding were being diverted for other purposes,
the first signs of dissatisfaction with the program's
implementation began to surface. Opponents of the raids on
the LWCF began to call for its reform, pointing to a backlog
amounting to billions of dollars that were not going to
worthwhile federal, state, and local land protection needs. 97
The Reagan Administration appointed its own
commission to update many of the findings reached by the
ORRRC. 98 Their report reiterated many of the proconservation recommendations of the ORRRC, but the
Commission added many of their own. Among other
suggestions, the Commission urged that the LWCF be made
into a true trust fund, invulnerable to diversion for other
purposes. 99 The report also pushed for the creation of a
network of greenways that would connect new and existing
parks, forest preserves, and other areas preserved as open

94. See id. at 169-72.
95. Among others, the ORRRC is credited with helping to make possible the
dedication of some eighty-nine million acres of wilderness lands to the
Wilderness Preservation System, as well as the creation of the Wild and Scenic
Rivers System, which designated over 7300 miles of rivers. Finally, the
Commission's report was key to the establishment of the National Trails
System, which has led to the protection of over 23,000 miles of scenic and
historic trails. See Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Inside Our Outdoor
Policy, at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pal13.html (visited Apr. 8, 2002).
96. S. REP. NO. 88-1364, at 1, 20 (1964).
97. See 146 CONG. REC. S9912 (2000) (statement of Sen. Landrieu); see also
SAMATULSKI & SIY, supra note 39, at 3 (naming the U.S. Treasury accounts
where the moneys reserved for the LWCF are held, totaling a backlog of
$9,672,662,467.69 by 1994).
98. See Exec. Order No. 12,503, 50 Fed. Reg. 4491 (Jan. 28, 1985) (creating
the Presidential Commission on Outdoor Recreation Resources Review).
99. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON AMERICANS OUTDOORS, AMERICANS
OUTDOORS 254, 258-59 (1987).
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space.' °
The President's Commission on Americans Outdoors
helped to generate significant support in Congress for the
revitalization of the LWCF."' The result was the drafting of
the American Heritage Trust Act (AHTA).' The AHTA was
the first major piece of legislation to attempt to create
steady funding sources for both the federal and state sides
of the LWCF.'" The AHTA proposed to guarantee $1 billion
in funding for the LWCF.
Additionally, it would have
allowed for the moneys in the fund to generate interest,
which would be automatically available without the need
for further appropriation.'
While the bill received
considerable support in both Houses of Congress, 10 6 it was
not brought to a vote in either year that it was introduced.
Although it went further than any other bill attempting
to make the LWCF a permanent trust fund, and can be
credited with helping to bring about the compromise offered
by H.R. 4578 (itself a significant step forward for federallysupervised conservation programs), CARA was defeated by
many of the same arguments that doomed the AHTA. The
most visible one is the fear many Members of Congress
have of taking such a significant amount of authorized
federal expenditures "off-budget." In the debate that ensued
before CARA's passage in the House, many representatives
warned of the dangers of allowing federal spending
initiatives to be put on "automatic pilot," arguing that
allowing the LWCF to become a permanent trust fund
amounted to an abdication of congressional responsibility
for prioritizing appropriations and ensuring that they are
spent exactly as they are intended to be.' °7 Some
representatives, in arguing for CARA's defeat, saw dedicated funds as serious threats to the constitutional duties of
Congress:
It is also pointed out this bill [H.R. 4578] does not provide States

100. Id. at 145-48.
101. See H.R. REP. No. 101-148 (1989).
102. H.R. 876, 101st Cong. (1989).

103. See id. at § 204.
104. See id. at § 203(e).
105. Id. at § 204.

106. The AHTA had 222 sponsors in the House and 38 sponsors in the
Senate when Congress adjourned in 1989.
107. See 146 CONG. REC. H2833 (2000) (statement of Rep. Regula).
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and local governments with a predictable funding stream. You bet
your life it does not, and it was not so designed. Why should we
give a predictable funding stream for grant programs to State and
local governments in precedence to the very programs for which
we are directly responsible? We do not have a fully predictable or
legally enforceable funding stream for schools. We don't have it for
most of our health care programs. We don't have it for a wide
variety of the programs that are subject to debate every year. It is
just for that reason that we do not have it. They should be subject
to debate and revision with respect to priorities every year. That is
why we have a Congress. 108

Other CARA opponents argued that securing the
spending within the LWCF would give it unfair priority
over other more worthwhile projects, such as veterans'
benefits and education.1 9 They suggested that a temporarily
sound economy made the idea of a dedicated fund look
better than it really was:
[We have had] five extremely good economic years. If we pick those
five extremely good economic years and say, well, that's been the
average for five tremendously strong economic years, let's make it
the average in perpetuity, forever and ever, and let's not make it
the average, let's put it on autopilot. Let's turn the switch so that
every year, bad year, year [in], year out we spend $450 million to
acquire more federal lands. I believe that makes no sense and I
would ask the members of the panel, which among you believes
that the economy is going to stay as strong forever in the future as
it has been for the last five years? I suggest no one believes that.
Yet this legislation would lock in, in entitlement, $450 million a
year11to buy new federal land even if the economy took a serious
0
dip.

Supporters of CARA responded that giving the LWCF
trust fund status was the only way to help state and local
governments plan their conservation goals with any
confidence. They touted the certainty and predictability
that CARA would have provided, allowing those entities to
108. 146 CONG. REC. 59916 (2000) (statement of Sen. Gorton).
109. See 146 CONG. REC. H2829 (2000) (statement of Rep. Manzullo); see

also HearingBefore the Sen. Environment and Public Works Comm. on S. 25, S.
2123 and S. 2181, 106th Cong. 54 (2000) [hereinafter Pending Legislation]
(statement of Mike Hardiman, American Land Rights Association) ("Sometimes
we win, sometimes we lose, but the regular appropriations process is
democracy. [A] trust fund is not democracy.").
110. Id. at 20 (statement of Rep. Shaddeg).
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use the funds granted by the federal government to obtain
additional
finances
from private individuals
and
corporations who would no longer be afraid that the
commitment to purchase the land was not there."' They
argued that only a trust fund model like the one embedded
in CARA would make long-term conservation planning
more feasible, since applicants would no longer have to
worry about yearly political squabbles:
I will say, from my own experience as a legislat[or] and then
governor of a state which had a very expansive land acquisition
program, it was our finding that unless you had a dedicated source
that could be depended upon in which people had confidence, that
a land program tended to become an annual fight within the
political entities as to who could get on the train that was leaving
town that day because there was no confidence that there was
gonna be another train leaving on the following day... One of the
benefits of having an ensured source of funding is not only the
adequacy of the funds, but the fact that it allows you to do
intelligent planning and the establishment of priorities. People
who look at that list and say, I'm on the priority list, but I'm five
years downstream, will have enough confidence that the program
will exist five years from now, that they will be willing to defer
their aspirations until their time has come. 112

CARA supporters further stressed that Congress had
only recently passed trust fund legislation guaranteeing
funding for highways and airports."
B. The Sprawl Debate Begins to Tip the Land Conservation
Debate in the Conservationists'Favor
Because CARA was ultimately defeated by the passage
of H.R. 4578, it is uncertain how or whether its provisions
ensuring the dedicated use of LWCF moneys to
conservation purposes would have stood up to legal
challenges.' However, it is apparent that the ubiquitous
111. 146 CONG. REC. H8643 (2000) (statement of Rep. Miller).
112. PendingLegislation,supra note 109 at 34 (statement of Sen. Graham).
113. See The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-69, 113 Stat. 986 (1999). Sections
301-316 set forth specified prohibitions and limitations for the expenditures of
federal moneys appropriated to the Airport and Airway Trust Fund and
Highway Trust Fund.
114. There is at present no federal caselaw addressing the ramifications of
redirecting funds from sources designated as dedicated funds. However, many
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nature of sprawl and the continuously expanding body of
available literature describing its effects is largely
responsible for the tremendous showing of support it
received, possibly paving the way for future legislation that
does confer trust fund status upon the statute. The
following discussion will briefly examine how the evolution
of the sprawl debate made a difference in swelling the
ranks of the conservationist movement well beyond those

who had already been calling attention to its negative
impacts.
Urban sprawl has been described as the "spread-out,
skipped-over development that characterizes the noncentral city metropolitan areas and non-metropolitan areas
of the United States."115 Its costs have been wellair pollution, expensive infrastructure
documented:
commitments, traffic congestion, destruction of environmentally sensitive land, and the acceleration of poverty
levels in the central urban areas that sprawl emanates
from." 6 Americans have been aware of the existence of
settlement patterns consistent with the current definition
of sprawl since the early twentieth century, when highways
and the automobile were just entering their prime."' The
presence of sprawl is perhaps most easily detected by
examining the rate at which the population of a metropolitan area grows and comparing it to the rate at which its
urbanized land area increases."8 This pervasive pattern has
cases at the state level exist. See Opinion of the Justices, 665 So.2d 1389, 1391
(Ala. 1995) (holding that appropriation to other departments of state
government of funds derived from motor vehicle fees, excises or licenses
obviously would violate constitutional dedication of those funds to highway
purposes). See also In re Opinion of the Justices, 85 N.E.2d 761, 764 (Mass.
1949) (holding that fees paid in connection with registration, operation, and use
of motor vehicles and constitutionally dedicated to State Highway Fund cannot
be diverted to maintenance of subways, tunnels, and other structures owned
and operated by Metropolitan Transit Authority); Auto. Club of Or. v. State, 840
P.2d 674, 683 (Or. 1992) (holding unconstitutional statutes imposing tax on
underground oil storage and fee on motor vehicle emissions and assigning
proceeds to specified environmentally constructive purposes because of conflict
with constitutional dedication of such revenues for highway purposes).
115. Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl
Debate in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 137, 137
(1998/1999).
116. See William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism,and the Problem of
InstitutionalComplexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 59 (1999).
117. Burchell & Schad, supra note 115, at 139-40.
118. See Douglas R. Porter, Reinventing Growth Management for the 21st
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consistently brought Americans face to face with the
realization that their decisions to pursue careers and
lifestyles in an increasingly mobile and spread-out manner
requires a reintroduction to and reevaluation of the
threatened environmental values they also cherish."9 The
reflections have fueled the growing perception that sprawl
is chiefly responsible for lowering quality of life standards
in communities across the nation.
Many attempts have been made to gauge how urban
sprawl has altered the public's perception of its quality of
life. Studies consistently show that people and businesses
rate "environment" and "quality of life" among the most
important factors in choosing where to locate."' Just as the
two presidential commissions produced reports illustrating
the increasing public demand for outdoor recreational
opportunities, reports that eventually helped to launch
groundbreaking conservation legislation, numerous other
studies have since been published that helped to galvanize
support for CARA. Americans for Our Heritage and
Recreation produced the study most closely associated with
the CARA legislation.'22 The conservation-focused not-forprofit organization announced that a survey conducted of
1000 voters in the fall of 2000 revealed that the majority
(80%) was in favor of permanently funding land and water
conservation. 2 ' The study conducted an extensive analysis
of the political and geographic backgrounds of those
surveyed and concluded that most voters in general,
regardless of their political affiliation or other factors,
feel
"a sense of urgency" about protecting land and water.' 24
More extensive surveys not directly linked to CARA and
the LWCF have regularly been conducted since the first

Century, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 705, 708 (1999). As an

example, Porter points out that between 1950 and 1995, the populations of the
Chicago area grew by 48% while the urbanized land area grew by 165%. Id.
119. See id. at 711-12.
120. See id.
121. Tom Horton, Rethinking Growth, LAND & PEOPLE, Annual Report 2000,
at 21.
122. See Americans for Our Heritage and Recreation, New LWCF
Initiatives: Preserving Land, Water, Wildlife and Natural Resources: The Way
to Win Americans' Hearts (And Votes!), at http://www.ahrinfo.org/fallpoll.html
(last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
123. Id.
124. Id.
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ones ordered by the ORRRC in 1960.125 The results have
consistently showed that outdoor recreation is more
important than ever to Americans. 126 The original ORRRC
report, for example, had predicted a tripling of demand for
public land to be used for recreation by the year 2000,127 a
figure that was actually surpassed in 1983.128 Reports by
federal land management agencies have also shown that
the number of people visiting public land for recreational

purposes has drastically increased since the middle of the

twentieth century. 129 These reports are not without their
critics, however. Some question their accuracy and
usefulness by pointing out that many of the people who
decry the environmental degradation associated with urban
sprawl are often the ones who help perpetuate it. 3 ° Because
these studies cannot correct for "cognitive dissonance," say
the critics, there is no proven way to gauge the true value
that people give to the conflicting interests represented by
sprawl and conservation.'
One reason why so many more Americans have begun
to favor increased government involvement in conservation
125. See, e.g., Emerging Markets for Outdoor Recreation in the United
States: A Report to the Sporting Goods Manufacturers Association and the
Outdoor Products Council, availible at http://www.orca.org/infosource/NSRE
(last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
126. For example, the 1994-95 National Survey on Recreation and the
Environment, translating its results of 17,000 people randomly polled to the
nation's entire population, found that 94.5% of Americans (or 189 million
people) participated in at least one form of outdoor recreation in 1994. See id. at
http://www.orca.orgfinfosource/NSRE/execsumm.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
The survey also found that the total number of people in 1994 engaging in
outdoor recreation had increased from 89% in 1982. Id.
127. ORRRC REPORT, supra note 21, at 25.
128. R. JEFF TEASLEY ET AL., PRIVATE LANDS AND OUTDOOR RECREATION IN
THE UNITED STATES (Univ. of Georgia, Faculty Series No. 97-19, 1997), available
at http://www.agecon.uga.edu/-erag/nplostxt.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
129. See U.S CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1954-1999 (indicating that visits to National Parks steadily increased from
46,224,794 to 275,300,000 visitors between 1953-1997).
130. See Lloyd Billingsley, Facts Versus Fantasy on Urban Sprawl, PAC.
RES. INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, at http://www.pacificresearch.org/action/
actionl7.html (Mar. 29, 1999) (excerpts from a speech by Steven Hayward
describing the "cognitive dissonance" of Americans who bemoan the fast pace of
land development but move into the suburbs to satisfy their desire for more
space).
131. Cognitive dissonance is the phrase used to explain the phenomenon of
desiring two wholly incompatible things at the same time without being
troubled by the conflict. Id.
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is that the environmental movement has become much
more sophisticated in the way it gathers, analyzes, and
presents data to the public. Mainstream environmental
groups that champion increased governmental acquisition
of public land have become, over the last several decades,
much more capable of quantifying and qualifying the effects
of sprawl and over-development. This is due largely to the
dramatic rise in both their membership ranks and the
number of resources available to them.'32 For example, since
1962, the National Parks and Conservation Association, the
Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society, three of the most
prominent interest groups active in national parks policy,
have each experienced an increase in membership from
around 20,000 to well into the hundreds of thousands. 3'
Extensive research into the economics and science of
conservation policy by these groups has helped to sharpen
and polish their arguments for increased government
protection of open space. This enhanced analysis has helped
to foster more appreciation for the benefits of undeveloped
land by demonstrating to the general public rational
methods for determining its value through the use of
traditional economic terms."'
C. The Role of States and Local Governments: Partof the
Solution and the Problem
The increased pressure brought by the expanded
resources of environmental organizations and the
proliferation of polls questioning Americans about their
views on sprawl and open space were not lost on state and
local authorities. Since the consequences of sprawl first
began to attract attention in the 1950s, little has occurred
132. See Christopher J. Bosso, Seizing Back the Day: The Challenge to
EnvironmentalActivism in the 1990's, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990'S,
53, 62 (Norman J. Vig & Michael E. Kraft eds., 1997); see also John C. Hendee
& Randall C. Pitstick, The Growth of Environmentaland Conservation-Related
Organizations:1980-1991, 10 RENEWABLE RESOURCES J. 6-11 (1992).
133. William R. Lowry, NationalParks Policy, in WESTERN PUBLIC LAND AND
ENVIRONMETAL POLITICS 150, 157 (Charles Davis ed., 1997).

134. See

JOHN TIBBETTS, OPEN SPACE CONSERVATION: INVESTING IN YOUR

COMMUNITY'S HEALTH 7-9 (1998) (explaining that the value of open space can be
demonstrated by the use of fiscal impact analysis, real estate market value,
enhancement value, agricultural production value, natural system value, and
contingent valuation); see also CHARLES J. FAUSOLD & ROBERT LILEHOLM, THE
ECONOMIC VALUE OF OPEN SPACE: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS (1996).
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to change the historical premise that land management is
almost exclusively within the jurisdiction of local
government.'
This premise is frequently justified by the
argument that local governments are usually in the best
position to respond to the needs of their constituents." 6 The
federal government, even where it intervenes in state and
local land use planning, continues to leave most of the
authority in their hands. '
As the effects of sprawl began to be more keenly felt,
state government began to supplant the authority of local
entities to manage their land resources. Recognizing the
quality of life issues that sprawl has forced them to come to
grips with, some states have taken the innovative approach
of incorporating conservation goals within a broad
framework of state health, environmental, and social
goals.31 8 States became active in the formulation of comprehensive land use plans for the environmentally sensitive
areas within their borders as it became apparent that local
zoning laws were inadequate for stopping the reach of
sprawl.'39 Growth ordinances became favored in place of
zoning as it was recognized that the latter was more
concerned with designating land for specific types of
development rather than with actually controlling or
restricting development in general. 4 ' Rallying behind the
principles of the recently- coined term "smart growth," more
than thirty states are now in the process of designing and
implementing centralized land use to address development
and conservation goals.' Many states have complemented

135. Buzbee, supra note 116, at 92-94.
136. See id.
137. See id.

138. See

OREGON PROGESS BOARD, OREGON BENCHMARKS: 1993 REPORT TO

THE LEGISLATURE (Salem 1993); see also MINNESOTA PLANNING, MINNESOTA
MILESTONES 1998: MEASURES THAT MATTER. These state-led programs are
indicative of new efforts to view environmental goals as inextricably
intertwined with other principles governing the public welfare. See also JIM
NORTHUP, THE ADIRONDACK CONDITION: ECONOMIC, ENVIRONMENTAL & SOCIAL
WELL-BEING (1998) (detailing environmental, economic, and social indicators of
communities in the Adirondack State Park in New York).
139. Daniel R. Mandelker, Managing Space to Manage Growth, in 2000
ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK 413, 416-17 (Deborah Mans ed., 2000).
140. Justin Shoemaker, The Smalling of America? Growth Management
Statutes and the Dormant Commerce Clause, in 2000 ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 139, at 485, 491-92.
141. Horton, supra note 121, at 20.
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their growth management 2plans by pursuing aggressive
land acquisition policies. 4 Borrowing through general
obligation bonds has been a popular way for state and local
governments to purchase open space. Voters have
consistently shown their support for such measures. 4 1 In

November 2000, 175 state and local ballot initiatives
proposing pro-conservation and acquisition measures were
approved-more than 80% of all such initiatives proposed."'
Where state funds are lacking, conservationists have
turned to help from the private sector to help accomplish
their goals. By forging a variety of agreements with
governments, private landowners, and industry, private
land trusts have been instrumental in setting aside ecologically and environmentally valuable land as open space.
In addition to their usefulness in expanding the financial
capability of government to purchase open space," 5 land
trusts are often able to negotiate agreements for purchase
and protection where government is statutorily unable to
intervene except through the imposition of more controversial regulatory controls.

46

Moreover, land trusts have made

frequent use of their status as tax-exempt charitable
organizations, realizing significant cost savings for themselves and future conservation-minded buyers. 4 Acting on
these natural advantages, land trusts have become
increasingly more active in conservation initiatives since
the 1960s.' 8 More than 1100 local and regional land trusts
assist in furthering the open space preservation needs of

142. Connecticut, for example, has instituted its Open Space and Watershed
Land Grant Program with the goal of preserving one-fifth of the state's entire
land mass by 2023. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-131d (1999).
143. Horton, supra note 121, at 23 (noting that voters and legislatures
nationwide have approved at least $10 billion to preserve open space from
sprawl; see also TIBBETTS, supra note 134, at 10. (noting that voters approved
almost seventy ballot measures for parks, farmland, open space, recreation, and
water quality projects.
144. Alan Greenblat, Voters Opt to Pay to Play, GOVERNING, Feb. 2001, at
110.
145. Land trusts are often able to purchase land that is under immediate
development pressure and then hold it until an interested government entity is
financially able to buy it from them. Christopher J. Duerkson and Richard Paik,
Open-Space PreservationAfter Dolan, in TAKINGS 270 (David Callies ed., 1996).
146. See ROGER MELTZ ET AL., THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 528 (1999).
147. Duerkson, supra note 145, at 270.
148. TIBBETTS, supra note 134, at 6.
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communities across the country.149 To date, their efforts
have 150succeeding in setting aside more than 1,204,587
acres.
However successful state and local government entities
have been in designing and implementing conservation
projects for their constituents, there is evidence to support
the claim that more federal involvement is desired.
Nowhere was this need more apparent than in the House's
passage of CARA in May 2000. In drafting CARA and
putting it to a vote, Congress (or at least the House of
Representatives) showed that it was more than willing to
consider stepping in to bolster the states' efforts:
The federal government has an essential role to play in this area,
because it can set national priorities and distribute funds that are
beyond the States' capacity to raise. And this bill takes on that
legitimate Federal role in the right way by [putting] back some,
not all, but some of those revenues that the federal government
gains from exploiting our national resources into preserving our
national resources.

CARA gained momentum largely because of the
growing realization that local governments, long given the
lead role in establishing the direction of land use patterns
for their respective communities, were not equipped to
tackle sprawl without help from a more centralized
authority. Indeed, local governments are often seen as
largely to blame for the sprawl epidemic due to their need
to appear economically attractive to businesses. This need
often translates into enticing incentives, often in the form of
relaxed growth restrictions and zoning laws designed to
permit industries to practice leapfrog development in
previously undeveloped areas far outside the urban core. 5 '
Unless strong public consensus demands otherwise, local
officials will usually be reluctant to turn away new
economic development opportunities that may easily flee
149. Id.
150. Trust for the Public Land, Summary of Accomplishments, LAND &
PEOPLE, Fall 2000, at 42.
151. 146 CONG. REc. H2833 (2000) (statement of Rep. Boehlert).
152. Burchell & Schad, supra note 115, at 137-38. Barring the occasional
failure of a business establishment stemming from a withdrawn development
plan for an access-allowing highway exit, Burchell and Schad observed that
"[r]arely, however, has an economic entity failed in the United States because it
was developed too far out." Id.
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elsewhere if land use restrictions are viewed as unduly
harsh.'53 Powerful transportation, construction, and real
estate interests continue to wield substantial influence over
our elected officials, whose concentrated and considerable
lobbying resources give them a significant advantage over
the general voting public.'54 Moreover, because the
authority of small municipalities to govern the direction of
growth ends at their town line, even aggressive efforts by
one or a handful of entities to restrict growth through
zoning and comprehensive planning will do little to curb the
effects of haphazard and inefficient development that
permeates an entire region.'55 More and more regions in the
United States are beginning to suffer from hopelessly
uncoordinated and conflicting layers of fragmented
government, where no one entity has the wherewithal or
the desire to check the spread of sprawl.'56 International
forces may soon start to play a significant role in
exacerbating sprawl, as large urban-centered businesses,
fearing that they will be the next to experience the rash of
terrorist attacks that have recently struck the nation, move
to the suburbs to reduce their visibility.'57 Indeed, as one
expert on urban sprawl asserts, these overwhelming
circumstances will ensure that "suburban... growth patterns have been, and will continue to58 be, inescapable
development forms in the United States.'
Many officials in this country who are tasked with
153. Buzbee, supra note 116, at 87.
154. Id. at 81; see also Michael A. Rivlin, The Secret Life of AAA, AMICUS J.,
Winter 2001, at 13 (describing the pro-sprawl agenda of the American
Automobile Association).
155. See Buzbee, supra note 116 at 91.
156. See JEFFREY A. ZINN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, REPORT No.
RS20011, MANAGING REGIONAL GROWTH: Is THERE A ROLE FOR CONGRESS?
(1999), available at http://cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/Risk/rsk-14.cfm (last visited
Apr. 8, 2002). As an example of this increasing trend, Zinn notes the
proliferation of local jurisdictions in Greater Denver, which now numbers 450
"special purpose" governments while the amount of urbanized land has spread
outward from the city across eight counties and forty-four municipalities. Id.
157. Kirk Johnson, Trade-Off by Environmentalists on Rebuilding; Looser
Rules for ManhattanAre Backed to Avoid a Bigger Threat: Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2001, at D1; see also Theresa Tedesco, Rush on for New Jersey Office
Space: Big Wall Street Firms Move Staff Across the Hudson River, NAT'L POST,
Sept. 17, 2001, at C1.
158. Burchell & Schad, supra note 115, at 139. Burchell and Schad proceed
to comment that "sprawl is so endemic to the culture of the United States that
it is almost impossible to change. Americans like its outcome." Id. at 159-60.
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balancing economic growth with conservation have echoed
these sentiments to some extent. Indeed, it would seem
both naive and politically self-destructive to argue for an
agenda focused on curtailing growth. The easier route is to
characterize a certain level of growth-induced sprawl as an
unavoidable inevitability. 159 Yet the popularity of CARA
demonstrates that an increasingly large segment of society
is beginning to show an interest in slowing the harmful
effects of suburban sprawl. By providing for additional
parks and open spaces, CARA's promise seems to lie in its
potential for disrupting the steady spread of unplanned
development by providing a means for federal, state, and
local authorities to create buffer zones between areas of
unchecked growth.
Increased acquisition of land for public use may prove
somewhat effective in alleviating some of the pressures and
unpleasantness of sprawl, but does it really control it? Some
critics argue that it will not, claiming that piecemeal land
acquisition will have little or no effect on development
patterns. Open space acquisition programs are only
effective, they insist, if it takes the form of coordinated
purchases that form "greenbelts" around the areas experiencing development pressures. 16 Otherwise, they conclude,
the pursuit of open space preservation in the same uncoordinated manner that characterizes over-development will
merely create "green islands in a sea of sprawl."'

159. See Christine Todd Whitman, Governor of New Jersey, Remarks at the
Conference on New Jersey's New Development Vision, Trenton War Memorial,
(Sept. 26, 2000) (assuring growth proponents that New Jersey's new "smartgrowth" plan will not disrupt the state's projected patterns of increased
economic
growth),
available
at
http://www.state.nj.us/governor/
njdevelopment.html (on file with the Buffalo Law Review).
160. Open Space & Environmental Quality: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works, 106th Cong. 174 (1999) (statement of Thomas
B. Stoel, Jr.). Greenbelts are not a new idea in the anti-sprawl toolbox; some
statutorily enacted plans have achieved success for smaller areas at the state
level. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 44-0103, 44-0121 (McKinney 1997)
(establishing New York State's Hudson River Valley Greenway statute, which
provides for the creation of voluntary regional compacts to develop cultural
parks and waterfront revitalization programs along the Hudson River valley).
161. Open Space & Environmental Quality: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Envtl. & Pub. Works, 106th Cong. 174 (1999) (statement of Thomas
B. Stoel, Jr.).

788

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

IV. PRIVATE PROPERTY VS. PUBLIC OPEN SPACE: THE COURTS
WEIGH IN

Despite this controversial conclusion, CARA and H.R.
4578 offer compelling evidence that sprawl is a problem
that can be at least tempered by continued government
spending and supervision. The next section of this
Comment will discuss how the push for increased governmental participation in natural resources conservation has
galvanized the property rights movement, leading to a
series of landmark decisions that has had (and may
continue to have), serious repercussions for the continued
viability of land use regulations.
A. Lucas, Dolan, and Del Monte Dunes Set the Pace
When the fates of major policy agendas are at stake, the
needs of conservationists, who seek more government
involvement in the regulation and acquisition of
environmentally sensitive and recreationally valuable
lands, are often seen as diametrically opposed to those who
argue for private property rights.162 As the sweeping support
shown for CARA and H.R. 4578 indicates, however, most
elected officials now realize the political desirability of
showing at least some sympathy for conservationist goals.
This is especially true where the benefits of proposed
economic development are not seen as an acceptable
tradeoff for the recreational, ecological and open space
values that would otherwise be lost. The economic and
social values of open space have become so widely
acknowledged today that most politicians are no longer
comfortable with adopting a stance that could be seen as too
blatantly unsympathetic to the objectives of conservationists.163 Indeed, most anti-environmental legislation that is
considered today is in the form of riders attached to
unrelated bills, allowing them to be voted on without
162. This was especially true when the Reagan administration came to
power. See Norman J. Vig, PresidentialLeadership and the Environment, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990's, supra note 132, at 95, 98.
163. See James Traub, The Anti-Hillary, N.Y. TIMES MAG., July 31, 2000, at
21 (using Representative Rick Lazio's senatorial campaign as an example of the
tendency of many of today's political candidates, for fear of being seen as too
liberal or conservative, to shy away from taking definitive stances on issues in
public).
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attracting too much attention.' The success of CARA and
H.R. 4578 demonstrate that the current debate on
conservation in the United States is not so much concerned
with whether the public interest in preserving open space is
on equal footing with private property as it is with what
means can properly be advanced to protect that interest.165
This is not to say that the property rights movement
has lost momentum in the struggle to be heard in the
conservation policy arena. To the contrary, there is still
strong support for the belief that landowners hold "absolute
rights" which preclude the government from imposing land
use controls that forbid them from certain uses of their
property.' 6 This concept began early in the country's
formative years, fueled by the perceptions that land and
resources were endlessly abundant and that the right to
167
own and exploit those lands was an American birthright.
Those who take such a perspective today decry how the
increase of governmental regulations has taken away those
absolute rights, unjustly making them stewards of the
"public trust."'68
For property rights advocates who protest the extent to
which the U.S. government has interfered with private use
of land, 9 the absolute rights theory has been gradually
164. Michael E. Kraft, Environmental Policy in Congress: Revolution,
Reform, or Gridlock? in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990'S, supra note 132,
at 119, 131-34; see also 146 CONG. REC. S9910 (2000) (statement of Sen.
Feingold) (expressing concern that Congress is becoming "habituated to the
practice of environmental legislation by rider" which limits the options of those
who wish to prevent them from having significant adverse effects on federal
environmental policy).
165. See George Cameron Coggins & Doris K. Nagel, "Nothing Beside
Remains": The Legal Legacy of James G. Watt's Tenure As Secretary of the
Interior on FederalLand Law and Policy, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 473, 548
(1990) ("[The conservationists have won the battle for the hearts and minds of
Americans. Because conservation and preservation values are firmly
entrenched in the American consciousness, legal questions now usually revolve
around means and the ends are seldom disputed.").
166. See generally Joan L. McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental
Protection: Is This Land Made for You and Me?, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 391, 392
(1999) (describing the resilience of the "absolutist conception of property rights"
viewpoint and its powerful influence on current land use discourse).
167. See Porter, supra note 118, at 706-07.
168. MacGregor, supra note 166, at 400.
169. See
Property
Rights
Foundation
of America,
Inc.,
at
http://prfamerica.org;
American
Land
Rights
Association,
at
http://www.landrights.org;
Public
Lands
for
the
People,
at
http://www.oicu2.com/plp/aboutplp.html; and Defenders of Property Rights, at

790

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

tempered by an argument that attacks environmental
regulations not on their face, but on their failure to properly
compensate those who are subject to the restrictions of the
regulation.170 Here we have, of course, the takings issue
spawned by the Fifth Amendment. 17 ' The three landmark
cases of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,172 Dolan
v. CitX of Tigard,173 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes" have significantly limited the extent to which a
governmental entity may impose limitations on the use of
private property. In Lucas, the plaintiff was successful in
arguing that the South Carolina Coastal Council, acting
pursuant to the state Beachfront Management Act'75 had
effected a taking by preventing him from building
residential homes close to a shoreline that the Council had
identified as being particularly sensitive to erosion. The
Supreme Court found for Lucas, holding that the
regulations promulgated by the Council had removed all
productive or "economically beneficial use"'76 from
Lucas's
177
"discrete and definable interest in real property.',
The Supreme Court further crystallized the taking
issue in favor of private property owners in Dolan by
striking down a municipal building permit condition that
the landowner dedicate some of the developable property to
easements that would be managed by the city as
greenways, bike paths and floodplains. This decision first
introduced its "rough proportionality" test178 in which court
required that "the city ...make some sort of individualized
determination that the required dedication is related both
http://www.defendersproprights.org/home.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2002).
170. See Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power,
37 AM. Bus. L.J. 527, 537 (2000).
171. The Fifth Amendment states, in relevant part, "nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
172. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
173. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
174. 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
175. The Beachfront Management Act was actually passed two years after
Lucas had purchased the lots in preparation for development. At the time of
purchase, no permits were required of him. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07,
1008.
176. 505 U.S. at 1027.
177. David L. Callies, Taking the Taking Issue Into the Twenty-First
Century, in AFTER LUCAS: LAND USE REGULATION AND THE TAKING OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT COMPENSATION 4 (David L. Callies, ed. 1993).
178. 512 U.S. at 391.
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in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed
development."' 179 The Court then found that the city's
dedication requirement failed this test, providing insufficient support for the argument that it would help to reduce
traffic congestion induced by the new store the plaintiff had
intended to build."' The decision helped to create new risks
and burdens for municipalities who use dedication
requirements to offset increased development with setasides for open space allotments.'
The Del Monte Dunes court refused to extend the Dolan
holding to regulatory takings cases not specifically
involving dedications. In that case, the plaintiff-respondent,
a developer, had sought to build on a thirty-seven acre
oceanfront parcel that had previously been used as a
terminal and tank farm by an oil company.'82 The plaintiffs
development applications were repeatedly rejected by the
defendant-petitioner, the City of Monterey, which made
increasing demands for reductions in the scope of the
development proposal.' 3 The City had required, among
other things, that the plaintiff set aside significant amounts
of the parcel to be preserved as open space.8 Concluding
that the City had no intention of permitting development of
the parcel under any circumstances, the plaintiff brought
suit to allege that the City's rigorous demands amounted to
an unconstitutional regulatory taking.'85 The District Court
for the Northern District of California upheld a jury verdict
for the plaintiff, awarding damages of $1.45 million. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.'86 The
Supreme Court held that that the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the "rough proportionality" test was unnecessary to
uphold the jury's finding that the City was liable to the
developer.'87 In doing so, the Del Monte Dunes court
distinguished between the dedications required in Dolan,
and the outright of denial of development which it found

179. Id.
180. See id. at 393-96.
181. Duerkson, supra, note 144, at 281.
182. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S.
687, 695 (1999).
183. See id. at 696-98.
184. See id. at 696-97.
185. See id. at 698.
186. 95 F.3d 1422 (9th Cir. 1996).
187. See Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702-04.
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' The District Court,
had occurred in the case at bar. 88
reasoned the Court, was correct in simply submitting to the
jury the much broader question of whether the denial of
development advanced a legitimate public purpose.'89 The
Court insisted that this holding was based on "settled
regulatory takings principles"; it refused to find that the
Ninth Circuit had "adopted a rule of takings law allowing
wholesale interference by judge or jury" with a municipality's legal right to impose ad hoc conditions upon a
developer's permit.19
The three decisions discussed above and their offspring
did much to suggest that governments wishing to advance
their conservation objectives seriously rethink the
practicality and effectiveness of achieving them by regulation. Although it is suggested that Lucas, Dolan, and Del
Monte Dunes have not had widespread applicability due to
the specific circumstances peculiar to their cases, critics
insist that damage has been done to both resource conservation and environmental policy frameworks. Particular
attention has been paid to the property rights legislation
that has been spawned by the decisions. Over half of all the
states in the United States today have active property
rights statutes imposing severe limits on the right of
government to forbid certain uses of private property.' 9'
Although no such legislation has been enacted at the
federal level, many bills continue to remain active in each
Congress.'92

188. See id.
189. Id. at 704-05. Whether a regulatory taking can be validated due to its
relation to a legitimate public purpose is a somewhat broad test, requiring factintensive deliberation on a case by case basis. See, e.g., Bonnie Briar Syndicate,
Inc. v. Town of Mamaroneck, 721 N.E.2d 971 (N.Y. 1999). In that case, the
plaintiff-petitioner landowner challenged a zoning law changing the use of its
private golf course from residential to solely recreational. The New York State
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's granting of summary judgment to the
town, finding that the Del Monte Dunes decision vindicated the "legitimate state
interest" prong first advanced in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
Upon applying this test, the Court further held that the town zoning board had
properly shown an "essential nexus" between the rezoning and the town's valid
and substantial interest in preserving open space. Id. at 976.
190. 536 U.S. at 706-07.
191. Oswald, supra note 160, at 527.
192. Id.; see, e.g., The Landowners Equal Treatment Act, H.R. 1142, 106th
Cong. (2000) (amending the Endangered Species Act of 1973 by prohibiting a
federal agency from using private property for non-federal purposes unless it
obtains the landowner's permission and either negotiates a voluntary
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Both the takings case law and property rights
criticized
for
improperly
legislation
have
been
subordinating the government's use of its police power,
which may be exercised to further the public health, safety,
welfare, and morals, by restricting the analysis (and
remedies) almost exclusively to a discussion of the economic
harm suffered by the property owner.193 Taking jurisprudence has been further criticized because courts frequently
ignore the environmental value of the parcel in question,
essentially holding that all land is fungible and therefore
unimportant to a discussion of to what extent the alteration
of property rights can be seen as equivalent to a taking:
The bundle of sticks that has become emblematic of ownership has
become theoretical to a fault, and that fault is the exclusion of the
res the thing, from analysis. Because the very essence of real
property is unique, and is governed by the rules of nature that
transcend the incidents of ownership, the failure of the bundle to
be tied to the ground makes9 4 the unique nature of a parcel of land
irrelevant to its disposition.

B. Recent Developments in Takings Jurisprudence
However accurate these criticisms may be in
illustrating how the explosion of the taking issue has
damaged the ability of governments to promote conservation practices and policies within their borders, it is fairly
clear that the doctrine is not likely to be reversed. Recent
developments at the federal and state levels have continued
to expand the definition of compensable takings, suggesting
that initiatives promoting increased federal and state
acquisition (like CARA) are likely to replace regulatory
efforts that seek to achieve the same conservation goals.
For instance, Washington's judiciary has recently
expanded the Supreme Court's Dolan test in Benchmark
Land Co. v. City of Battleground.95 In that case, the Court
agreement authorizing such use or compensates the landowner for the fair
market value of the federal use); see also American Land Sovereignty Protection
Act, H.R. 883, 106th Cong. (2000).
193. See Oswald, supra note 159, at 549.
194. Robert J. Goldstein, Green Wood in the Bundle of Sticks: Fitting
EnvironmentalEthics and Ecology into Real Property Law, 25 B.C. ENvTL. AFF.
L. REV. 347, 385 (1998) (footnote omitted).
195. 14 P.3d 172 (Wash. 2000).
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of Appeals upheld the application of the "rough proportionality" test to measure the City's requirement that a
developer make street improvements on a street adjacent to
the proposed development. The court did acknowledge that
the United States Supreme Court had intended their test to
apply only to exactions-land-use decisions conditioning
approval of development on the dedication of property to
public use.'96 But, in finding that the situation met with the
Dolan requirements for a regulatory taking, the court noted
that the City was attempting to wring a concession out of
the developer that had little to do with the development it
was responsible for. 9 7 There was enough of a similarity
between the money the City was demanding here and the
land exaction that the municipality had required in Dolan,
the court reasoned. If Dolan did not apply, they concluded,
there would be few limits to the conditions municipalities
could set. 9 '
In Cooley v. United States,'99 the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims found that the Army Corps of Engineers had
achieved a taking when they first denied the plaintiffs'
permit to develop wetlands, even though they later granted
it after litigation was initiated. The court rejected the
government's argument that their subsequent action to
allow the development divested the plaintiffs of their cause
of action for a taking under the Fifth Amendment: "From
the moment the [initial] denial was signed, the right to just
compensation vested. A taking even for a day, without
compensation is prohibited by the Constitution ... [Tihe
Army Corps of Engineers may not by ipse dixit declare that
a permanent taking is now temporary."'00
The court in Tahoe-Sierra PreservationCouncil, Inc. v.
Tahoe
Planning Agency... was asked to resolve
whetherRegional
a temporary
planning moratorium, enacted by the
196. See id. at 174 (citing City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)).
197. See id. at 175.
198. See id.
199. 46 Fed. Cl. 538 (2000).
200. Id. at 548 (citation ommitted) (emphasis added). It is important to note,
however that the permit eventually granted to the plaintiffs read
'PROVISIONAL PERMIT, NOT VALID, DO NOT BEGIN WORK."' Id. at 549.
The court found this "analogous to a physical invasion on the land, where the
government assures the land owner that it will remove the intrusive object, and
then claims that its mere assurances have ended the invasion." Id.
201. 216 F.3d 764.
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defendants in order to halt development while a new
regional land-use plan was being devised, effected a taking
of the plaintiffs' property. °2 In holding that the moratorium
in the instant case was not a taking, the court
acknowledged that, since no set formula existed for
mechanically determining when regulatory takings
occurred, the particular circumstances of each case were to
be driven by "essentially ad hoc factual inquiries."2 "3 The
majority further cautioned that the "widespread invalidation of temporary planning moratoria would deprive state
and local governments of an important land-use planning
tool with a well established tradition."2 °4 The Fifth
Amendment, they concluded was not to be turned into a
"oweapon to be used indiscriminately" at the expense of the
public interest. 205
Six judges issued a scathing dissent in the en banc
decision. They urged that the majority had ruled in blatant
disregard for the Supreme Court's ruling in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,"6
where it was determined that a temporary development
moratorium enacted in response to flood damage
constituted a taking, since "no subsequent action by the
government can relieve it of the duty to provide
compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective."2 7 The dissent further noted that the majority's
ruling would allow government entities to eschew
permanent regulations altogether if it was constitutionally
permissible to enact one temporary restriction after
another.
In a discussion of recent takings decisions and their
possible effect on future governmental reliance on
regulations to achieve conservation goals that might be
more easily accomplished with acquisition strategies, it is

202. Id. at 766.
203. Id. at 771-72.
204. Id. at 777.
205. Id. at 782.
206. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). The majority in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. answered this charge in by stating that "FirstEnglish is not even
a case about what constitutes a taking.... Because the question presented to
the Supreme Court related only to the remedy available once a taking had been
proven, the Court stated explicitly that it was not addressing whether the
ordinance constituted a taking." 216 F.3d at 777-78.
207. FirstEnglish, 482 U.S. at 321.

796

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

worth noting one more recent decision rendered by
Washington courts. Manufactured Housing Communities of
Washington v. State,"°8 although involving the taking of
private property for private use, is nevertheless significant
to a discussion of the government's ability to avoid
regulatory takings claims. The case involved the validity of
the statutorily-defined "right of first refusal" for the tenants
of a mobile home park wishing to prevent the park owner
from selling the property to a third party. The Washington
Supreme Court agreed with the defendant park owners that
the statute imposed an unconstitutional taking of private
property in that it destroyed the park owners' right to freely
dispose of their property. 09 The court found that the right of
first refusal unconstitutionally interfered with "a
fundamental attribute of ownership," and required the invalidation of the statute.210

The dissent emphatically argued that the majority's
holding was an improper attempt to go beyond the settled
doctrine that a landowner, in order to successfully bring a
facial challenge to a land-use statute, must prove that the
statute or regulation denied him of all economically viable
use of his property." ' The right of first refusal is neither a
fundamental attribute of property ownership nor even a
property right at all, the dissent continued, relying on past
Washington case law.212 In a ringing conclusion, the
dissenters summed up the damaging effect they expected
the decision to have on the state's previously established
takings parameters:
Today, the Washington Supreme Court strikes down legislation
designed to assist the vulnerable, and fundamentally alters the
judicial treatment of the police power, an attribute of government
long-recognized everywhere as essential to our fundamental
notions of ordered liberty. Today the Washington Supreme Court
revives the Lochner era, when a conservative United States
Supreme Court struck down measure after measure of state
legislation designed to ease the burdens of the oppressed and those
in need. Today, the Washington Supreme Court returns to the

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

13 P.3d 183 (Wash. 2000).
See id. at 190.
Id. at 194.
See id. at 203 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 202 (citing Robroy Land Co. v. Prather, 622 P.2d 367, 369-70

(Wash. 1980).
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days when property rights were considered more important than
human rights.

If courts are free to redefine and reclassify those
property rights that are "fundamental," the Supreme
Court's prior stance that the destruction of "one strand of
the bundle" of an owner's property rights is not a taking
may
because of the need to take the aggregate view
become vulnerable to a new wave of attacks declaring the
most minor and inoffensive regulations to be impermissible
Manufactured Housing Communities
As
takings.
illustrates, courts are upholding takings claims for an
increasingly diverse range of statutes, regulations, and
areas of law, endangering their capacity to protect the
public interest. 215 The cases previously discussed give much
weight to one scholar's prophecy, issued shortly after the
decision in Lucas, that regulations designed to protect the
natural, 6environment are in for "increasingly rough judicial
going. 21
C. Other Environmental Statutes Targeted-The Supreme
Court Reins In the Clean Water Act
It is important to briefly mention how the "uneasy and
continuously evolving balance 17 that pits other interests
against the obligations of government to conserve natural
resources for the public interest has been brought to a head
in disputes over other environmental laws apart from those
challenged by the Takings Clause. The recent landmark
decision rendered by the U.S. Supreme Court in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers2" ("SWANCC") provides a key example of how
the federal government is becoming increasingly limited by
the courts in its attempts to use long-standing environ-

213. See id. at 205 (Tallmadge, J. dissenting).
214. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
215. But see Eastampton Center v. Township of Eastampton, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11558 (D.N.J. July 9, 2001) (holding that a municipality seeking to set
aside open space may adopt land use ordinances that reduced allowable housing
construction without running afoul of the Fair Housing Act).
216. Callies, supra note 154, at 9.
217. DOUGLAS R. PORTER, MANAGING GROWTH IN AMERICA'S COMMUNITIES 18
(1997).

218. 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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mental regulatory approaches where the novelty of the
situation encountered suggests a broad interpretation of
Congressional intent. The Supreme Court rejected the
argument of the respondent U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
that Congress had intended for the Clean Water Act's 19
protections to extend to "isolated wetlands" and other
bodies of water not directly defined as "navigable waters,"
thus allowing them to deny the petitioners a permit to erect
a solid waste disposal site on some ponds that had become
home to a variety of migratory birds:
These are significant constitutional questions raised by
respondents' application of their regulations, and yet we find
nothing approaching a clear statement from Congress that it
intended to reach an abandoned sand and gravel pit such as we
have here. Permitting respondents to claim federal jurisdiction
over ponds and mudflats falling within the "Migratory Bird
Rule .
would result in a significant impingement of the State's
traditional and primary power over land and water use.221

In dissent, Justice Stevens protested the majority's
drawing of a new jurisdictional line on the "untenable
premise" that Congress had passed the Clean Water Act
merely to exert their commerce power, rather than to
prevent environmental degradation.
The Supreme Court's decision in SWANCC did not
conclusively foreclose the federal government's right under
the Clean Water Act to restrict environmental degradation
of all nonnavigable wetlands. 22' Nevertheless, the decision
indicates that long standing policies that previously
supported an expansive view of federal powers in the
environmental regulatory arena will continue to be severely
restricted. The Court's shift toward a more rigid and

219. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1994).
220. In 1986, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers created the "Migratory Bird
Rule," expanding their jurisdiction under the permitting requirements of §
404(a) of the Clean Water Act to intrastate waters that provide habitat for
migratory birds. See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
221. Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 177 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 177.
223. See United States v. Krilich, 152 F. Supp. 2d 983, 987-88 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (concluding that the Supreme Court in SWANCC did not reach the
question of whether the Clean Water Act could regulate isolated wetlands on a
basis other than its use by migratory birds).
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inflexible method of statutory analysis will increasingly
transfer governmental authority to promulgate conservation planning and open space protection onto local, more
decentralized jurisdictions. This will invariably mean that
the need for state, local, and regional governing bodies to
develop coordinated agendas for land use planning will
become more pressing than ever. The nature of suburban
sprawl and the potential for conflict at local levels, however,
suggests that occasional piecemeal purchases of land for
public recreational use will not, by itself, sufficiently
reverse sprawl's ill effects.224 CARA, then, provides the
opportunity to substantially advance conservationist objectives without being significantly curtailed by evolving
takings and federalism jurisprudence in the courts.
225
V. CARA's DELICATELY ACHIEVED BALANCE

It
was
against this backdrop
of increasing
disenchantment with governmental regulatory schemes
that the Representatives sponsoring CARA, a bipartisan
coalition consisting of 197 Democrats and 113 Republicans
and led by an Alaskan Congressman who had never
previously enjoyed a reputation as a supporter of
progressive pro-environmental legislation226 introduced,
debated, and passed their ambitious legislation. In
restoring the politically unglamorous and legally vulnerable
LWCF to its cap of $900 million and providing hundreds of
millions of dollars more for wildlife protection and
restoration under the Pitman-Robertson Act,227 the sponsors
and their supporters sought to adopt an approach that
224. See supraPartIII.C.
225. See 146 CONG. REC. H2831 (daily ed. May 10, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Tauzin). That CARA was touted as a bill of compromise between
conservationists and property rights supporters is further underscored by the
fact that Representative Tauzin, an ardent supporter of the bill, was also the
first to introduce a private property "bill of rights" in Congress. See Private
Property Owners' Bill of Rights Act, H.R. 790, 104th Cong. (1995).
226. It is now well documented that Representative Don Young (R-Alaska)
had once referred to environmentalists as "the self-centered bunch, the wafflestomping, Harvard-graduating, intellectual idiots that don't understand that
they're leading this country into an environmental disaster." Kim Heacox &
Henry Lentfer, Brahm's Symphonies and the Hermit Thrush: Wild Alaska in
the Year 2000, WILDERNESS 23 (2000).
227. Conservation and Reinvestment Act of 2000, H.R. 701, 106th Cong. tit.
3 (2000).
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would dramatically expand federal and state conservation
capacity while sidestepping many of the legal land mines
they would have encountered with more coercive legislation. Indeed, CARA's sponsors were extremely wary of
ruffling the feathers of a property rights movement that
was only slightly more receptive to a statute enabling
increased federal and state open space acquisition than a
constitutional amendment repealing the Takings Clause.
They realized that a governmental initiative focusing on
acquisition rather than regulation, although less intrusive
on its face, would still draw fire for reducing the total
amount of land that would remain in the private domain.
Throughout the debate, the bill's supporters referred to
' They
private property owners as "America's foundation."228
insisted on using the word "conservation" in their dialogues
instead of "preservation," to lessen any images the latter
might evoke of land being forcibly taken away from
landowners and off the tax rolls, one of the central
arguments historically employed to oppose the acquisition
of public land as open space.
CARA's authors took pains to placate the fears of
property rights champions that the bill's acquisitionoriented focus amounted to little more than another "huge
federal land grab" supplanting local control.23 ° Both the
CARA legislation passed by the House and the version
reported out of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources contained provisos incorporating the
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment"' and preventing
federal agencies from assuming any new authority under
the Act.2' Both bills also included caveats requiring that
any money authorized for land acquisition by CARA be used
to purchase parcels where the parcel's owner was willing to
sell.3 These efforts would prove successful in winning over
many supporters in the American West, a region where
conservation rhetoric is traditionally frowned upon, largely
because of the large amounts of land the federal govern228. 146 CONG. REC. H2827 (daily ed. May 10, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Young).
229. Id.
230. 146 CONG. REC. H2841 (daily ed. May 10, 2000)' (statement of Rep.
Dingell).
231. H.R. 701, 106th Cong. § 10(a) (2000); S. REP. No. 106-413, § 6 (b).
232. H.R. 701, § 10(b); S. REP. No. 106-413, § 10(b).
233. H.R. 701, § 205 (d)(2)(a); S. REP. No. 106-413, § 207 (b)(3)(a) at 12.
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ment holds in the name of the public domain.234
CARA's authors also seized the opportunity to direct
some of the legislation's substantial spending allocations to
alleviate the disenchantment of landowners with the
perennially controversial Endangered Species Act.235 CARA
stipulated that the administering Secretary of the Interior
would have the authority to enter into Endangered and
Species Recovery Agreements, a vehicle that would reward
private property owners with CARA funds if they could
demonstrate "measurable progress" in practicing land use
techniques that encouraged, or at least did not inhibit, the
recovery of endangered and threatened species on their
property.236 By emphasizing voluntary3 agreements and
"common sense and balanced solutions" ' in this way, the
legislation's sponsors hoped to further dissipate the sharply
drawn battle lines that treat property rights and
conservation as mutually exclusive goals.
VI. ACQUISITION STRATEGIES AS THE PATH OF LEAST
RESISTANCE

By providing for the largest expansion of federal
conservation funding in the history of the United States,
CARA's success demonstrates that the federal government
is choosing acquisition over other approaches as the
preferred method of stepping up their efforts to conserve
and preserve the recreational and open space resources
their constituents increasingly demand. CARA and H.R.
4578 signify that Congress has chosen to take the lead in
234. See HOUSE COMM. ON RESOURCES, WESTERN
OF
1999
ACT
REINVESTMENT
AND
CONSERVATION

VALUES

WITHIN THE

(CARA) (1999), at
http://resourcescommittee.house.gov/106cong/energy/cara/carawestemvalues.h
tm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) (listing the ways in which CARA signifies an
improvement over the acquisition process that existed under the current LWCF
with respect to the protection of private property owners from involuntary, nonCongressionally supervised federal acquisition projects); see also WESTERN
GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, POLICY RESOLUTION 00-0 19, ALLOCATION OF LAND AND
WATER CONSERVATION FUND APPROPRIATIONS (2000), http://www.westgov.org/
wga/policy/00/00019.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2002) (stating support for a "true
partnership... for a coordinated park and preservation effort that make
optimal use of federal, state and local commitments to these lands" through
revitalization of the LWCF).
235. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1540 (1994).
236. H.R. 701, § 714.
237. 146 CONG. REC. H2828 (2000) (statement of Rep. Young).
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increasing federal and state capacity in adopting acquisition as "the surest method for land protection,"' 38 thus
avoiding many of the problems encountered through a
regulatory approach. Because of the effect that major
environmental statutes like National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) and the Wilderness Act have had in
transferring authority to make conservation decisions from
the administrative to the legislative arena, it is now evident
that Congress will be asked to play a greater role in
deciding which
lands within the United States are worth
preserving. 2 By seriously considering CARA and passing
H.R. 4578, Congress has willingly embraced this role.
Attempts to further conservation objectives through
acquisition, particularly through the awarding of grants to
states, are already on solid Constitutional footing, much of
which was provided by the Supreme Court's holding in New
York v. United States.2 40 In its decision, the Court declared
that the federal government's imposing of conditions on
grants to states were constitutionally sound as long as the
state action desired was merely encouraged instead of
compelled.2 4' The right of government to purchase land for
the purpose of public use and enjoyment is seldom
challenged in the courts.242 The most common issue in
dispute in cases where the government seeks to buy private
land involves disagreements on the proper amount of4
compensation for the property interest acquired. 1
Occasionally, however, a governmental entity may find its
right to purchase land challenged on the grounds that the
use intended for the property is not a strictly "public" one.244
However, courts frequently afford governments a great deal

238. Duerkson, supra note 128, at 267.
239. See Craig W. Allin, Wilderness Policy, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 126, at 180.
240. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (upholding the right of Congress to attach
conditions on the receipt of federal funds to states, as long as the states retain
the "ultimate decision," after reviewing the federal conditions, to pursue or
refrain from seeking the funding). CARA prohibits state agencies from diverting
funds received under the act from being used for inconsistent purposes. H.R.
701, § 306. With minor amendments, CARA also retains the conversion
restrictions of the LWCFA. H.R. 701, § 209.
241. 505 U.S. at 168.
242. See MELTZ ETAL., supra note 146, at 518.
243. See id. at n.18.
244. Id.
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of latitude in such situations.245 Moreover, "willing seller"
programs such as the ones encouraged by CARA have
significant advantages over more coercive forms of land use
control because they are more likely to induce landowners
to voluntarily recognize the importance (and profitability) of
restricting development on their property.2 "6 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, there is the argument that
supporting the efforts of government to satisfy constituent
demands for open space is the best way to ensure the
accountability of those officials, since the constituents are
most often the ones assuming the costs of the acquisition.247
Despite the fact that CARA was widely acclaimed for
being the "most significant piece of environmental
legislation in a generation, 48 many detractors of the
legislation and its underlying principles persisted in their
efforts to stall the bill. They stand for the realization that,
although we are closer than ever to a public consensus that
supports active government involvement in pursuing
conservation measures, we must continue to acknowledge
and address those issues that suggest that increased
acquisition of land for public use can have serious
repercussions for some. At the forefront of the rhetoric of
those opposed to CARA and the principle of increased
government accountability and involvement it reflected is
the long-enduring argument that the federal government
already owns more than enough land, especially in the
west. In Congress, some likened the role of the Secretary of
Interior, the top federal official responsible for the
acquisition, disposition, and management of the 760 million
acres it holds for the national government to a "de facto
planning and zoning Czar," wielding his CARA-enhanced
powers at the expense of local authorities.249 Others pointed
out that CARA would hurt western communities by

245. Id.
246. Id. at 523. As an example of the "win-win" situations that often arise
when the landowner is willing to sell, the author notes the significant decline in
the number of takings lawsuits over environmentally fragile lands in Nevada's
Lake Tahoe Basin. The decline is attributed to the negotiation of amicable
public purchase agreements. Id. at 522-23.
247. Buzbee, supra note 116, at 127.
248. 146 CONG. REC. H2835 (daily ed. May 10, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Weller).
249. 146 CONG. REC. H2830 (daily ed. May 10, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Manzullo).
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shrinking the tax base of municipalities whose holdings
were already dwarfed by those of the federal landmanagement agencies."'
In essence, the argument boiled down to the failure of
CARA to address just when the point could be reached that
the federal government could say it owned enough land.
CARA's supporters responded by debunking the theory that
the federal government intended to greatly expand their
land base, arguing that the amount of federal holdings is in
fact greatly reduced due to the policy adopted in 1947 that
concentrated on shifting ownership back into state
control. 5' Moreover, the CARA proponents argued, some of
the land acquisitions that would be made possible by CARA
were necessary in order to provide access, in the form of
easements negotiated with private landowners, to currently
existing public acreage."' Finally, it is worth pointing out
that, for all the efforts of the Sagebrush Rebellion and the
Wise Use Movement to argue for increased local control,
they themselves realized the costly burdens they would
have to shoulder if the federal
government had relinquished
25 3
control over its holdings.

Those who see increased federal acquisition of land as
unnecessary and unjust also point out the problems the
federal land management agencies are experiencing in
managing the property they already own. Recent studies
have, in fact, pointed out the advantages the private sector
enjoys over the public managers in responding to market
incentives that ensure that property will be put to optimal
use. 2 1 Opponents of an increased federal role in acquiring

250. 146 CONG. REC. H2832 (daily ed. May 10, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Gibbons) (Gibbons was referring in particular to the effects that increased
federal acquisition would have on his state of Nevada, where 90% of the land is
in federal hands).
251. 146 CONG. REC. H2837 (statement of Rep. Vento).
252. See id.
253. Sandra K. Davis, Fighting Over Public Lands, in WESTERN PUBLIC
LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 133, at 26 (noting that states
would lose, among others, over $99 million in federal payments in lieu of taxes
(PILTS), as well royalties from oil, gas and coal extraction. Additionally, states
would have to bear the costs incurred from stewardship of the newly acquired
lands); see also Robert L. Glicksman, Lecture, Fear and Loathing on the Public
Lands, 45 KAN. L. REV. 647, 653-54 (1997).
254. See Anderson & Leal, supra note 95 (arguing that private landowners
are in the best position to conserve environmentally sensitive land because they
can more accurately respond to incentives to satisfy environmental and
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land for conservation purposes emphasize that there
currently exists a significant maintenance backlog in the
holdings of the National Park Service and the U.S. Forest
Service. The origins of this backlog can be attributed in part
to the aggressive policies the National Park Service began
to adopt in the 1960s that sought to dramatically increase
the number of parking areas, roads, visitor centers, and
other facilities that would serve the public. 55
26
The projects led to enormous increases in visitation
that the NPS was not quickly able to adjust to. In addition,
the NPS experienced significant lapses in maintenance
policies such as fire control and the monitoring of external
factors on the national parks, have left a workload that the
federal government has struggled to complete.2 57 The
maintenance woes of the federal agencies have not been
made easier by the refusal of the court to allow them to
delegate tasks to private entities without retaining adequate oversight.258
Even environmentalists found shortcomings in the
approach reflected in CARA. Their concerns chiefly lay in
the fear that the enhanced federal funding for the coastal
states that permit the offshore oil and gas exploration and
extraction that forms the bulk of the available moneys
under the LWCF.25 9 Because so much of the revenue that
makes the acquisition efforts of the LWCF (and now H.R.
4578) possible comes from such sources authorized by the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, conservationists and
environmentalists have long had to view the environmental
degradation that occurs in these areas as an acceptable
tradeoff for the enhanced buying power they provide for
purchase and protection of onshore lands. The Supreme
Court has also protected the statute from environmental
challenges to the actions of oil and gas companies
authorized by the act. In Amoco Production Co. v. Village of

recreational demand than public managers).
255. Lowry, supra note 133, at 152.
256. Id. at 154 tbl.8.1.
257. See id. at 167.
258. See National Park and Conservation Ass'n v. Stanton, 54 F.Supp. 2d 7
(D.D.C. 1999) (holding that the NPS had improperly delegated its statutory
duties to manage the Niobrara Scenic River in Nebraska to a private actor,
since it retained no oversight or final reviewing authority over actor's actions).
259. See This Land Could Be Your Land, AMICUS J., Fall 2000, at 26.
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Gambell,"6 ° the court denied an injunction that would have
enjoined the Secretary of the Interior from selling oil and
gas leases off the shore of Alaska, in large part because an
application of the "balance of harms" test did not favor the
interests of the plaintiffs (Alaskan natives) in protecting
their resources over the investment of the oil companies in
the lease.261 Despite this implicit acceptance of the "lesser of
two evils"' that the LWCF requires for its purposes to be
realized, many prominent organizations in the environmental movement did not offer their support to CARA until
the bill was amended to reduce the possibilities that oil and
gas exploration would increase as a result of the increased
funding provided to coastal states.262
Finally, CARA and the active federal involvement it
foretells is not welcomed with open arms by those who
question how voluntary the "willing seller" stipulation
within the legislation would really be in practice. Testimony
provided at congressional hearings conducted to discuss
CARA revealed recounts of instances where the decision to
sell was not voluntary at all but the result of increased
pressure applied by federal agencies that, in "checkerboarding" communities with adjacent land acquisitions,
effectively removed any economic or social incentives to
remain.26 Property rights groups warned that CARA would
fuel a "hysterical rush" to "wipe out" these communities,
victims of a government that cared little about how public
land was actually purchased, nor how much.26 The
opponents of CARA did not mince words in foretelling the
significant harms that would be inflicted upon the small
western landowner:

260. 480 U.S. 531 (1987).
261. Id. at 545-46.
262. See H.R. REP. 106-499, at 39 (1999) (explaining CARA's "disincentive
language," which restricts the state's allocations to those offshore revenueproducing areas where a moratorium on oil and gas exploration has not been
imposed).
263. Conservation and Reinvestment Act of 2000: Hearing on H.R. 701
Before the Senate Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 106th Cong. 146 (2000)
(statement of Chuck Cushman, Executive Director, American Land Rights
Association).
264. Id. In his prepared testimony, Mr. Cushman mentioned reports
published by the General Accounting Office, revealing glaring inconsistencies
between the amount of land sought to be acquired and the amount actually
acquired by the National Park Service.
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What is the end game? Many members of Congress keep asking
how America is [going] to extract itself from Kosovo and the
Balkans. We would ask how Congress would be able to shut off
this new, unappropriated, dedicated and off-budget trust fund
entitlement once it is started. The experience of the past says you
will be unable to do so. The end result for anyone who cares to look
beyond the years of his own term is obvious. The solution is so
much bigger than the problem that the solution becomes
the
2 5
6
problem. Land acquisition will overwhelm rural America.
CONCLUSION

Despite the gravity of these concerns, it is far from clear

that any one, or even a combination of them, was the
ultimate reason for CARA's downfall. Indeed, the dedicated
funding provisions, property owner incentives, and
ambitious spending package promised by the landmark
legislation may have failed simply because it ran out of
time. 66 CARA's most adamant supporters blamed the
Senate appropriations leaders for refusing to allow the bill
to be voted on so they could retain discretionary control
over conservation spending initiatives. In displaying their
frustration with the weaker provisions of H.R. 4578, they
suggested that serious reform was needed in the way the
higher house conducted business:
[E]very governor in the country now has blasted this agreement.
Every governor. The mayors, the legislative bodies have blasted
this so-called interior appropriations. So do not give everybody

265. Id. It should be noted that the definition of "rural America" lends itself
equally readily to two starkly different images: that of the small-time individual
farmer and that of the corporate "agribusiness" industry. Through their
aggressive consumption of land, application of pesticides, generation of vast
amounts of organic waste and depletion of available water supplies, the latter
has done more to exonerate the growing conservationist movement than it has
to vilify it. See Robert H. Smith, Livestock Production: The Unsustainable
Environmental and Economic Effects of an Industry out of Control, 4 BUFF.
ENVTL. L.J. 45 (1996); see also James A. Rasband, The Rise of Urban
Archipelagos in the American West: A New Reservation Policy? 31 ENVTL. L.J. 1,

55-60 (2001) (arguing, within the context of the effects of Western land
ownership on Indian reservations, that ranchers and other commercial
entrepeneurs have no valid private property right to use public lands).
266. See Krist, supra note 5. ("With time in the legislative session growing
short, Senator Lott clearly was reluctant to embroil the chamber in such a
dispute, which would delay passage of other key budget bills and interfere with
fall election campaigns.").
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how much they support it. In reality, the governors know right
now we are back to square one. We have got to go back to the
appropriators and grovel, hold our hand out and beg at the end of
session. By the way, Mr. Speaker, this has happened to us now for
6 years, 8 years, 10 years... The natives are getting restless,
buddy. I am going to suggest, respectfully, that this is not the way
this Congress was set up.

Although H.R. 4578 was negatively characterized
shortly after its passage into law as a "cardboard cutout" of°
CARA,26 1 "CAlRA-ite"," and "a basket of rosy promises27
few could deny the significance of the bill. Clearly H.R.
4578 would not have been possible without the extensive
debate and discussion over the proper federal role in
conservation policy that CARA's introduction helped to
spark. Clearly, interest in the initiatives proposed by the
bill is not going away; CARA is enjoying renewed support in
the current Congress.27 ' Because of the events of the past
Congress, the federal government has discovered and
acknowledged the growing ranks of Americans who demand
that they play a more active part in helping state and local
governments and communities to plan for the long-term.
There are indications that this involvement will be
welcomed even at the expense of certain long-standing,
long-defended principles of property ownership. It is also
apparent that conservation measures will continue to focus
on acquisition-based efforts, while regulatory restrictions
may abate somewhat. Do the majority of Americans truly
understand the tradeoffs and sacrifices involved with their
recent endorsement of increased federal activity in the
conservation arena? If they do not now understand,
considering the rate at which the conservation debate is
continuing to evolve and expand, perhaps they soon will.

267. 146 CONG. REC. H8648 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Young).
268. 146 CONG. REC. S9912 (2000) (statement of Sen. Landrieu).
269. Robb Brady, CARA Lite Is a Hollow Imitation, IDAHO FALLS POST REG.,
Oct. 11, 2000, at A6.
270. Wayne Regelin & Mark Van Putten, Land Trust Bill Little More Than
Rosy Promises, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 20, 2000, at 10B.
271. See Conservation Bill Passes House Committee, ENVTL. LABORATORY
WASH. REP., Aug. 16, 2001; Larisa Epatko, Major $3 Billion Conservation Bill
Emerges in Senate, ENvT. & ENERGY DAILY, Aug. 6, 2001.
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